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"Defendant protests that he was hampered in his 
efforts to prove truthfulness by being denied 
discovery of certain evidence. However, a review 
of the records indicates that although defendant 
had responsibility to compel timely discovery, he 
did not pursue it. See Utah R. C|v. P. No. 37. 
Further, some of defendant's request for 
admissions dealt with totally irrelevant issues 
pertinent only to another case. Other requests 
related to documents and tranlscripts which 
defendant could have easily introduced at trial 
but did not. Therefore, we find this assignment 
of error to be totally without merit." 
Opinion, Pg. 6, Paragraph 4. 
This statement is totally inaccurate, and tarings up the question -
Did any of the appellate judges read Point Jl of Appellant's Brief? 
Appellant did pursue discovery under the ver^ same rule, Rule 37 the 
Court stated appellant did not use. 
Had the Court read Point I or reviewed the documents referred to in 
Point I of Appellant's Brief, they would have fouhd: 
1. Appellant specifically moved to Compel (Discovery under Rule 37, 
R. 48. (ADD. 1) 
2. Appellant filed a Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 37, (2), (3), (4), of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure R,61. (ADD. 2) 
3. Appellant's attorney, Mr. Robert Sherlock, filed a Motion to 
Compel, asking the Court "For an Order Compelling Plaintiff to 
Respond to those Interrogatories and Request! for Document Production 
previously filed herein," R. 189. (ADD. 3) 
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4. Judge Fishier recognized the Motion to Compel by defendant Mann 
was still pending, R. 197(4). (ADD. 4) Mr. Sherlock repeatedly 
attempted to get this detailed review accomplished but Judge Fishier 
told him he was not going to allow it, but he would not put it in 
writing. Judge Fishier did not allow the discovery nor would he ever 
deny this Motion in writing. 
5. Appellant filed a Motion to Compel pursuant to Rule 37, R. 254 & 
R. 255. (ADD. 5) 
At the same hearing defendant filed "Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute". R. 269-277. (ADD. 6) This Motion discussed more in detail 
the background of defendant's attempts to compel and again the Motions 
were taken under advisement by the Court R. 287. (ADD. 7) The evidence 
is irrefutable that this Court erred when stating "he did not pursue 
It." 
The fact remains, and the Record verifies, appellant was denied 
discovery on the very cases which were listed as sources of the material 
in the back of the book, "One Against the Storm". In the revised Amended 
Complaint, R. 157 to R. 158, (ADD. 8) Mr. Christensen details the source 
of all their allegations, and as the cause of action in the suit, 
.specifically as: P-79-2 (hereinafter "Custody Action") R. 157(6) (ADD. 8) 
C-79-4063 (hereinafter "Trust Action") R. 157(6) (ADD. 8) and C-79-0772H 
(hereinafter "Tort Action") R. 158(6X7) (ADD. 8) The discovery 
appellant was refused related to the plaintiff Wadsworth's acts, solely 
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in these three suits named in all three revisions of their Complaint, 
with the exception of six questions, and fiv£ of these questions did 
relate to the other suits listed as references, in the back of the book, 
"One Against the Storm," Pages 218 through 221 (ADD 9) The sixth 
question related to plaintiff Wadsworth's changing a clients will and 
leaving himself the beneficiary of over half a pillion dollars, entitled 
in the matter of the Estate of William L. Orris, deceased Supreme Court 
No. 16280. The Utah Supreme Court ruled against Mr. Wadsworth on 
November 24, 1980. No discussion with the Coujrt ever took place about 
relevancy or the immateriality of the individual discovery request of 
appellant. The Court accepted Mr. Christensen's statement as fact, as 
this Court has. The Court erred in falsely stating appellant's request 
dealt with another case. There were never any other cases in which the 
Manns were involved with Mr. Wadsworth other than those cases 
Mr. Christensen, himself, gave as the sources of their charges. (ADD 8) 
These cases are the also the same ones Mr. Christensen named in his 
Revised Amended Complaint. (ADD. 8) These are the same suits 
Mr. Christensen claims are irrelevant and immaterial. To claim this 
regarding the very suits he listed in his complaint is "Deceit and 
Collusion" as described in Utah Code 78-51-31 aijid in the judgment of the 
United States Court of Appeals, Carlucci v. Pip^ Aircraft 775 F 2d 1440 
(1985). (ADD. 10) 
Appellant did repeatedly ask for the Rights of Discovery, which are 
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part of the "Due Process of Law." It Is an Indisputable fact, verified 
by the Record, and appellant properly and timely filed Motions to Compel 
under the U. R. C. P. Rule No. 37, which the Court cited, and the record 
verifies no ruling was ever made. Appellant went ahead with trial, 
knowing he had been denied Discovery and Venue Change Motions In 
violation of his constitutional rights, In order to get away from the 
bias judicial attitude as that expressed, to the jury, at the opening of 
trial, by Judge Fishier R. 499. (ADD 11) 
POINT II 
The Court erred In Its Opinion when It stated, on Page 6. 
"Defendant claims that plaintiff gave perjured 
testimony at trial. We need only respond that the 
jury was entrusted to resolve any question of fact 
relating to witness credibility" See Little 
America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 
(Utah 1982). Obviously by Its verdict the jury 
disagreed with defendant's position." 
Opinion, Pg. 6, Paragraph 2 
The facts In the case cited are far removed from what happened In the 
case of Wadsworth v. Mann . The Courts Statement, "Obviously by Its 
verdict, the jury disagreed with defendant's position," Is a totally 
false assumption. The jury was prevented from seeing the documents which 
.perjured Mr Wadsworth1s statements given to the jury. Appellant will 
cite just two of many Instances where Judge Fishier sustained 
Mr. Chrlstensen's objections, In order to hide Mr. Wadsworth's perjury 
from the jury. 
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(1). Mr. Christensen tried to enhance Mr. Wadsworth's character by 
eliciting the statement from Mr. Wadsworth that he had never had any 
disciplinary proceedings against him at the Utah State Bar or elsewhere. 
R. 568, (Pg. 70) line 12 through R. 569, (Pq. 71) line 4. (ADD. 12) When 
Mr. Sherlock tried to enter a letter from other attorneys written to the 
Utah State Bar which perjured that testimony, Exhibit 14-D (ADD. 13) 
Judge Fishier would not allow it to be entered R. 828. (Pg. 330) (ADD 14). 
(2). Attempting to further enhance Mr. Wadsworth's character and 
credibility with the jury, Mr. Christensen askeq him if he expected any 
personal gain in obtaining custody of David for Mark Wheeler, Mr. 
Wadsworth1s answer was, quote: 
"Absolutely not. After the Custod^ Matter was 
handled, if I had wanted any of that inoney, I could 
have made a petition to the Court for reimbursement of 
fees, and I suppose most any Court wojjld have found 
that giving a child back to its natural father or to 
its father - - adoptive father, in this case — was a 
justified expenditure. I never made any application 
for such fees, (emphasis added), I 
Wheeler to pay my fees. When he couldn 
and that became obvious then I withdrew from the 
expected Mark 
't pay my fees 
The above volunteered statement during trial, relates entirely to 
P-79-2 for which appellant was refused discovery. When Mr. Sherlock 
attempted to enter Exhibit 13-D (ADD. 16) to prove Mr. Wadsworth has just 
perjured himself before the jury, Mr. Christensen objected and Judge 
Fishier, again, kept from the jury that Wayne Wadsworth had knowingly 
lied under oath to them. R. 661, (Pq. 162), line 6 through R. 662, (Pg. 
163), line 7, (ADD. 17) Also see Page 9, Answer to Interrogatory No. 10. 
(ADD. 18) Mr. Wadsworth, under oath, stated he had filed for attorney's 
fees on August 31, 1979. The Third District Court Records show Wayne 
Wadsworth appeared in Court and argued for the payment of this money and 
was refused it by Judge Baldwin. (ADD. 19) & (ADD. 20), (Pg. 2) item 4. 
These weren't questions Mr. Wadsworth was asked by opposing counsel, but 
planned questions by his own attorney to conceal his motives attributed 
to him by appellant in his book. These actions documented by the records 
are proof both Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Christensen knowingly objected to 
factual proof of perjury being entered in order to win their case. Mr. 
Christensen saw that document and made his own choice between ethics and 
subornation of perjury. The record doesn't lie. It was a voluntary 
choice of subornation of perjury or obeying the Utah Code and the Rules 
of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1. The judge saw these documents also and 
the record will show he also chose, likewise, to suppress the proof of 
perjury. Appellant has documentation of numerous lies and perjuries of 
Wayne Wadsworth and proof his attorney, Ray Christensen, had in his 
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possession documents detailing these felonious acts. The Facts in the 
record show Wayne Wadsworth lacked veracity eveh under oath. Regardless 
of any rulings or opinions, these facts will not go away. Other examples 
of perjury of Mr. Wadsworth were listed and documented in Point V of 
appellant's brief and at a minimum each of ijhose examples constitute 
misleading the Court. Other examples of perjuiry and the commission of 
vicious criminal acts of Mr. Wadsworth and otfjer members of Watkiss & 
Campbell is detailed and cited to the Record in Court of Appeals No. 
870211-Ca filed February 19, 1988. 
POINT III 
1. The remaining allegations were that plaintiff 
(1) engaged in the bribery of a witness; (2) 
deliberately mislead the court; 
Opinion, Pg. 1, Footnotes 
The Opinion statement that appellant hacfl alleged Mr. Wadsworth 
engaged in the bribery of a witness is false. 
Appellant assumes that statement is the one cited and misquoted out 
of context from the book R. 160. Paragraph 4 (ADl]>. 21) 
"The hearing brought out a number 
appalled me. First, it seemed 
Wadsworth had 'bought' the ted 
incompetent doctor whose words simoly aped Sylvi's 
and Mark's opinions . . ." 
of facts that 
[that Sylvi and 
timony of an 
If the Court had referred to the actual quotation in the book in its 
entirety on Page 42, (ADD 22), they would have found that the word 
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"bought" was enclosed in double quotation marks, as shown in Exhibit 12 
of appellant's brief. The use of double quotation marks as used in the 
book, with the word "bought" is a common practice to give words special 
meanings or connotations. Pg. 1682, #4. (ADD. 23) Reading Page 42 in 
entirety and the 17 pages following this statement, would have clarified 
what was being said and how it was being used, and would have dispelled 
any inference of bribery, even though someone was not familiar with 
english punctuation marks. Any jurist who had read the book was 
disqualified from the jury. A prime example of giving special meaning to 
words enclosed in double quotation marks is found in Carlucci v. Piper 
Aircraft Case 84-5576 wherein Judge Fay states: 
"It is my personal observation that too many 
practitioner have "Sold out to the client". 
Judge Fay, Circuit Judge, 775 Federal Reporter, 
2nd Series Pg. 1454. (ADD. 10) 
Obviously, the Honorable Judge Fay did not suggest money changed 
hands just for violating statutes or rules in the representation, when he 
said "Sold out to the client", no more than I did when I said he "bought" 
the testimony of an incompetent doctor, whose words simply aped Sylvi's 
and Mark's opinion. The Court's propensity was to put an entirely 
different and improper connotation on my statement. 
POINT IV 
S. Mann, One Against The Storm, pp. 160, 161, 179, 
183, 185 (1980). 
These statements charge criminal misconduct and a 
want of capacity of fitness to practice law, thus 
constituting libel per se. 
Opinion, Pg 4, Paragraph 3 & 4. 
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All above referenced pages relate to statements or actions of 
Mr. Wadsworth, which occurred during one or Jnore or the three cases 
listed by Mr. Christensen as sources R. 157 through R. 158. (ADD. 8), for 
which appellant was refused discovery. The statements are true and 
supporting documentation, which had been previously suppressed, are a 
matter of record in appellant's brief No. 870211-CA filed with the Utah 
Court of Appeals on February 19, 1988. Appellant concurs that statements 
charge criminal misconduct and a want of capacity of fitness to practice 
law. Supporting documents consist of the admission by Mr. Wadsworth and 
others at Watkiss & Campbell that documents and records have been 
destroyed, a felony, in violation of Utah Code 76-8-510, evidence that 
ion disputing statements 
Rule 11, U.R.C.P. & Utah 
Mr. Christensen had documents in his possess 
which he made in his pleadings in violation of 
Code 78-51-31, that Mr. Wadsworth deliberatell lied to The Honorable 
Judge Winder, and documentation of numerous acts of perjury of Mr. 
Wadsworth and others. The Courts Opinion rel 
appellant to send a copy of Brief 870211-CA, ^nd documentation to the 
Salt Lake County Attorney for investigation relative to the commission of 
criminal acts. (ADD. 24). 
ative to this, prompted 
CONCLUSION 
(1) The record is indisputable, appellant moved four (4) times to 
Compel under Rule 37, U. R. C. P. 
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(2) Wayne Wadsworth committed perjury, in front of the jury, in the 
cases appellant cited, when answering questions posed by his own 
counsel. Appellant's counselor tried to enter documents which proved 
Mr. Wadsworth1s perjury. The documents provided conclusive evidence of 
Mr. Wadsworth's perjury. However, after being reviewed by opposing 
counsel and the judge, the documents were withheld from the jury when an 
objection was made by counselor for Mr. Wadsworth and objection sustained 
by the judge. 
(3) Documents affirm irrefutable evidence of a lack of veracity on 
the part of Mr. Wadsworth, which makes suspect Mr. Wadsworth's entire 
testimony and makes a mockery of the integrity of the judicial system. 
(4) The appellant used verbiage in his book, with accepted and 
proper english punctuation marks, to indicate a word was being used to 
express an entirely different meaning than the normal usage of the word. 
The author neither thought or claimed that any money changed hands 
between Mr. Wadsworth and Dr. Marshall. In Dr. Marshall's deposition, 
Dr. Marshall contributes all of his assumptions and conclusions to Mark 
and Silvi Wheeler, which is what the appellant said, "the testimony of 
an incompetent doctor which aped Silvi & Mark's opinions". Appellant 
•used the same punctuation marks commonly used by authors, the Federal 
Judge, teachers, etc., for connotating words used with a special meaning. 
("Sold" down the river), ("Bought" the story, hook line and sinker), 
("Sold out" to his clients), or ("Bought" the testimony of a doctor). 
(5) The Record is indisputable that appellant was denied discovery 
under the rights of "Due Process of Law" as guaranteed by the Fifth 
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Amendment and the "Equal Protection Clauses" of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Sec. 7 a^ nd 24. 
(6) Documented facts dispute the Opinion renldered by the Court. 
(7) Discovery will provide proof of every statement in the book, if 
the Court will not collaborate in suppressing the 
Appellant petitions this Court to reconsider 
on February 25, 1988, and grant appellant discover 
Appellant hereby certifies that this petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay. 
documents. 
r their Opinion rendered 
ry and a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of Malrch, 1988. 
z?&- u r7 L. '<*? 
Stanley C. Mann, Pro se., 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I HAND DELIVERED foiir (4) true and correct 
copies of the Appellant/Defendant's APPELLANT'S (PETITION FOR REVIEW, this 
24th day of March, 1988, to: 
Ray R. Christensen Esq., 
Gainer M. Haldbi1lig 
Attorneys for Plaintiff & Respondent 
Christensen, Jensen, and Powell 
510 Clark Learning Center 
175 South West Temple 




R. 48, R. 49, R. 50 
R. 61, R. 62 
R. 189 
R. 195, R. 196, R. 197 
R. 254, R. 255 
R. 269, R. 270, R. 271, R. 272 
R. 287 
R. 157, R. 158 
Pg. 218 through 221 - One Against Tl^ e Storm 
Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft, 775 F 2d 1440 (1985 No. 84-5576, 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit 
R. 498, R. 499 
R. 568, through R. 569 (Pages 70 - 71) 
Exhibit 14-D 
R. 828 (Page 330) 
R. 593 (Page 94) 
Exhibit 13-D 
R. 661, R. 162 (Pages 162 & 163) 
Statement made under oath by defendant Wadsworth admitting 
he had petitioned the Court for the funds he testified he 
had not petitioned for, to the jury. (Add. 15) Pg. 9. 
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ADDENDUMS 
Objection to Memorandum of Disbursements and Costs P-79-2 
(Custody Case) which Mr. Nadsworth 
the Court as Addendum 16. 
prepared and filed with 
Order Taxing Costs in Custody Case P-79-2, which 
Mr. Wadsworth: 
(1) Filed for Costs. (Add. 16) 
(2) Argued over twenty minutes for Costs in court. 
(3) Mr. Wadsworth was denied Costs by Court. 
(4) Swore, under oath, that he filed for these Costs. 
(5) Testified under oath at trial tfjat he had never made any 
application for such fees. (Add. 15) 
R. 160 Statement from One Against I The Storm out of context 
and mi squoted. 
Page 42 from One Against The Storm. 
Front page Webster's New Word Dictionary, Second College 
Edition and Page 1682, outlining the usage of double 
quotation marks #4. 
Letter sent to Salt Lake County attorney, Mr. David Yokum, 
March 2, 1988. 
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Tabl 
STANLEY C. MANN 
3500 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITL 102 
P. 0. BOX 27317 
SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH 84 127 
TELEPHONE: ( 8 0 1 ) 2 6 3 - 1 1 1 4 
I n P r o p r i a P e r s o n a 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT Or THE ' IHIRJL) J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKL COUNTYl, STATE OF UTAH 
H . WAYNE WADSWORTH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s 
STANLEY C . MANN; QUEST PUBLISHING 
I N C . ; A I R TERMINAL G I T T S ; ALBLRTSON'S 
I N C . ; B . DALTON BOOK SLLLER; BOBCO'S 
SELF SERVICE FOODS; BOBCO•S: BOB'b 
MAGAZINE CORNER; BOOK VAULT; CARR 
STATIONERY; D I C K ' S THRirTWAY; GRAND 
CENTRAL; HARMON'S, I N C . ; IGA KOMBO; 
JORDAN VALLEY BOOKS AND CARDS; LITTLE 
PROFESSOR BOOK CENTER; LOGO'S BOOK 
STORE; MACEY'S , I N C . ; REAM'S MARKETS; 
SAM WELLER'S BOUNTIFUL BOOK STURE; 
SERVUS* DRUG; SKAGGS-ALPHA BETA; 
S . M . C . MANAGEMENT CORP; S M I T H ' S 
MANAGEMENT CORP; THE BUS STOP; THE 
MAGAZINE SHOP; THE WILDFLOWER; 
WALDENBOOKS; ZCMI; Z I O N ' S BOOK STORE; 
a n d DOES ONE t h r o u g h r i F T Y , 
D e f e n d a n t s , 
MOTION TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
AND SANCTIONS 
C i v i l N o . C 8 1 - 8 6 4 4 
r~ 
- t 
' Comes now the defendant and pursuant to the provisions of RuTe 37 asks for the 
motion for extension of time be denied, that Lawyer, ^laintiff^a^^h^s counsel be 
compelled to provide answers to interrogatories, suppjy documents and that sanctions 
be assessed as listed below, 
FACT 11 Lawyer, plaintiff H. Wayne Wadsworth and his counsel filed 
this case in the Third District Court on November 10, 1931. 
FACT #2 Defendant's First Request for Production of Documents and 
First Set of Interrogatories to Lawyer, plaintiff, H. Wayne Wadsworth and his 
counsel were mailed by certified mail on December 29, 1981. Post Office receipt 
shows said documents were delivered to plaintiff on December 30, 1981. 
FACT #3 January 15, 1982 Defendant, Stanley C. Mann delivered 
answers to the complaint as prescribed by law. j 
FACT #4 Lawyer, plaintiff H. Wayne Wadsworth's answers to interrogator-
ies and production of documents were due on February 1, 1982. 
FACT #5 Tuesday, February 2, 1982 defendant received Motion for 
Extension of Time from Mr. Ray Christensen post marked Monday February 1, 1982. 
043 
Paye 1 of 3 
FACT #6 If Lawyer, plaintiff and hJLS attorneys did 
not have the information requested and tins infoimaLion they would 
have needed to substantiate thuii claims at thte time they iiled 
this action, their actions w«_re without basis 0f fact, lacking in 
merit and the action was filed for an improper cause other than 
that which any prudent man would brin \ . 
FACT #7 Lawyer, plaintiff is represented by Mr. Ray 
R. Christensen and Mr. Dale J. Lambert. Plaintiff ib also a 
lawyer himself. Therefore, even if one attorney has been involved 
m a lengthly trial it should not warrant an extension ot time 
for the Lawyer, plaintiff in answering his interrogatories and 
producing documents required by law. 
rACT #0 Lawyer, plaintiti's answer to defendant's 
counter complaint was due on Thursday, 1ebruar^ 4, 1982. Mi 
Christensen has tiled a motion that the case b(^  dismissed in a 
stall and delay strategy without noticing it u^> for a honing. 
rACr ft9 Defendant will file the interrogatories posed 
to him at the prescribed time out of lespect febr the law, and 
ft 
will be at Mr. Ray Christensen's office on Tuesday, 1ebruary 16th 
as scheduled for the taking of his deposition cf>ut of respect for 
the law, although Mr. Christensen is aware thatf defendant has 
been previously scheduled three times to give his deposition on 
different matters and it has been cancelled twice. 
FACT #10 The plaintiff and his attorney maliciously 
filed this case naming the customers which defendant does business 
with, knowing there was no justification foi: these charges. And 
as no attempt has been made to serve these customers, it is appaient 
this action was brought to hurt the business relationships wlucl 
defendant maintains with these customers. The$e delu^ have in-
creased the damages being suffered by the defendants. 
FACT #11 Because of the terroristic^ and malicious 
activities by the Lawyer, plaintiff and the stfutegys being 
implemented by his counsel, there is very little chance that this 
case will ever be settled without going to the jury. It is 
imperative that neither party be allowed to nu|i a mockery ol 
our judicial system through the use of technical chicanery. 
Page ? of 3 
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T h e r e f o r e (lelcinl.iiil .isks lot I In* 1 t> I Inwi mj : 
1. An order to compel the Lawyer, plaintiff to supply 
the answers to all of the interrogatories and1 produce the documents 
requested no later than February 11th, 1982. 
2. An order to compel the Lawyer, plaintiff to answer 
counter claim which was due on February £ 1 198 2 by February 12, 1982. 
3. The following sanctions: 
a. Compensation for sixteen hours of time set 
aside for the purpose of studying and analyzing the documents and 
answers which was wasted because of plaintiff's failure to comply 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and failure to notify 
defendant until after such time as answers were* due. Compensation 
to be at the same hourly wage normally paid t& Lawyer, plaintiff's 
attorney. 
b. Plaintiff assessed for the time wasted by 
the judge, his entire staff and for the use op the court. This 
money to be placed in a trust fund to be used to increase the 
number of judges to improve and speed up the judicial process 
and "£o serve as a warning to others who needlessly delay and 
obstruct the functioning of our judicial process. 
c. The Lawyer, plaintiff fce assessed $2,000 
a day to be put in escrow to cover the costs to the defendants 
which will be verified by the defendants at tlpe time of the trial, 
and for each delay which occurs from here on <f>ut for not comply-
ing with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
NOTICE 
TO THE DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL OF RECORD, that the defendant 
will call up the foregoing motion on Monday, ^ebruary, 8th, 198 2 
at the hour of 2:00 p.m. or as soon as counsel can bo heard. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1982. 
Page 3 if 3 -trV" A XT' A s* 
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Tab 2 
STANLEY C. MANN 
3500 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 102 
P. 0. BOX 27317 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4127 
TELEPHONE: (801) 263-1114 
In Propria Persona 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTV 
THII0 JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
STANLEY C. MANN; QUEST PUBLISHING 
INC.; AIR TERMINAL GIFTS; ALBERTSON'S 
INC.; B. DALTON BOOK SELLER; BOBCO'S 
SELF SERVICE FOODS; BOBCO*S: BOB'S 
MAGAZINE CORNER; BOOK VAULT; CARR 
STATIONERY; DICK'S THRIFTWAY; GRAND 
CENTRAL; HARMON'S, INC.; IGAKOMBO; 
JORDAN VALLEY BOOKS AND CARDS; LITTLE 
PROFESSOR BOOK CENTER; LOGO'S BOOK 
STORE; MACEY'S, INC.; REAM'S MARKETS; 
SAM WELLER'S BOUNTIFUL BOOK STORE; 
SERVUS DRUG; SKAGGS-ALPHA BETA; 
S.M.C. MANAGEMENT CORP; SMITH'S 
MANAGEMENT CORP; THE BUS STOP; THE 
MAGAZINE SHOP; THE WILDFLOWER; 
WALDENBOOKS; ZCMI; ZION'S BOOK STORE; 
and DOES ONE through FIFTY, 
Defendants, 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
AND FOR SANCTIONS 
Civil No. C81-8644 
r 
Defendants Stanley C. Mann and Quest Publishing Company 
hereby moves the Court, pursuant to the provisions'^^ Rule x 
37 (2), (3), (4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for an 
jorder compelling-Plaintiff to respond to certain outstanding 
discovery requests and for an order awarding Defendants their 
costs incurred in bringing this motion. 
On December 30, 1981 defendants served uri>on plaintiff, 
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff and 
Defendant's First Request for Production of Documents. The 
February 1, 1982. answers to these discovery requests were due or 
On February 2, 1982 defendants received Motion for Extension of 
Time from plaintiff's lawyer, postmarked February 1, 19 82. 
On February 2 , 1982 defendants filed a moltion to deny plaintiff's 
request for an extension of time and to compel discovery, (defendant 
notified plaintiff's counsel this same day.) 
0G1 
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On February 4, 1982 plaintiff filed a response to Defendants 
Request of Interrogatories and Production of {Documents prior to 
above motions being heard. 
Plaintiff failed to supply answers to Defendant's Interrogat-
ories No. 6 thru No. 50.which are interrogatories all allowable 
under U.C.R.P. #26, 33 and 34 referring to scjope of discovery. 
Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant) 's Request of Product-
ion of Documents requests #1 thru #21, all whp-ch are also allowable 
under U.C.R.P #26, 33 and 34. 
Defendant refutes plaintiffs general objection (A) under 
Response to Interrogatories regarding the defendants characteriza-
tion of Mark and Silva Wheeler as Family Clients. The plaintiff 
himself characterized this relationship in hip own repeated utter-
ances and unprofessional actions during the suits in which he admits 
to representation of Mark and Silvi Wheeler. Plaintiff refers to 
this special family relationship during the course of these suits. 
Attachment A. Page 4 0 and 41 of the transcript "Petition to Terminate 
Order of Temporary Custody" Case # P79-2 whi£h came before the 
Honorable Judge Bryant H. Croft on Friday, January 12, 1979. 
Defendant does not admit to the plaintiff's statement #3, 
under Response to Request for Production of Documents 
The action of the plaintiff regarding th^ discovery has 
necessitated this motion and warrants an awarcj of costs of 
defendants bringing this motion. 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully requests 
answers to Interrogatories No. 6 thru 50 and Request for Product 
ion of Documents #1 thru #21 be furnished immediately. 
Dated this 9th day of February , 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STANLEY^e-. MANN 
In Propria Persona nP') 
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Tab 3 
ROBERT D. SHERLOCK 
Attorney for Defendants 
261 East 300 South, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY C. MANN, QUEST 




Civil No. G &/ - Zta^ 
COMES NOW the Defendant S tan ley C. Hann, and moves the 
C o u r t for an Order c o m p e l l i n g P l a i n t i f f tp r e spond to t h o s e 
I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and Requests for Document Produc t ion p r ev ious ly 
f i l e d h e r e i n . 
T h i s Motion i s made upon the b a s i s t h a t P l a i n t i f f ' s 
response to sa id m a t t e r s , undated, a copy of which i s a t t ached 
h e r e t o , i s comple te ly nonresponsive to the i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and 
was not made in good f a i t h , " and the object ionjs s e t f o r t h t h e r e i n 
a re spu r ious and wi thout m e r i t . 
This Motion to Compel was p r e v i o u s l y brought before the 
Court on February 9, 1982 and was cont inued wi thou t d a t e . 
DATED t h i s ^Cy day of i d ^ ^ C ^ J T 1982. 
ROBERT D. SHERLOCK 




Ray R. Christensen 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
OCT 0 4 1982 
m&poAJ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY C. MANN, et al., 
Defendants 
ORDER 
Civil No. C-81-8644 
The plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' counter-
claim, motion for leave to file a revised amended complaint, and 
motion to compel discovery; and defendants' motion to compel 
discovery and motion for change of venu^ came regularly on for 
hearing before the Hon. Philip R. Fishier, one of the judges 
of the above-entitled court, on Tuesdayl, the 7th day of September, 
1982, at the hour of 2 o'clock p.m., Ray R. Christen .en, Esq., 
appearing as attorney for the plaintiff); and Robert D. Sherlock, 
Esq., appearing as attorney for defendahts; and the Court having 
heard the arguments of counsel and havijig examined the memoranda 
which they have filed in support of theflLr respective positions, 
and being now duly advised in the premises, 
19o 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGEp, AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants1 
counterclaim is denied; Provided, however, that it is ordered 
that the issues of the complaint and is|sues of the counterclaim 
be bifurcated, and that the issues of the complaint be tried 
first; and further, that in the event that plaintiff prevails on 
the complaint, the counterclaim should pe dismissed. 
2. That plaintiff's motion fbr leave to file his 
proposed revised amended complaint be a^ id the same is hereby 
granted. 
3. That plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is 
granted, to the following extent: 
Defendant is ordered to answer to plaintiff's interro-
gatories and to respond to plaintiff's request for production of 
documents, which were served upon him oh or about the 28th day 
of December, 1981, within thirty days from the date hereof; 
and in the event of his failure to answer said interrogatories 
and respond to the request for production within thirty days, 
said defendant's answer and counterclaim shall be stricken 
and his default entered. 
Plaintiff's motion to compel Stanley C. Mann to answer 
the question propounded to him at page 337 of his deposition 
is taken under advisement with leave td 
to file a memorandum in support of his 
counsel for the plaintiff 
position within thirty days 
and with leave to counsel for the defendants to file a responsive 
IS8 
memorandum within five days thereafter. 
Plaintiff's motion to compel defendant Mann to answer 
the question propounded to him on his deposition at page 380, 
line 6, is granted, and defendant Mann is ordered to answer 
said question within thirty days from tljie date hereof. 
4. That defendants1 motion tq> compel discovery is 
continued to a date when the Court and Counsel can make a 
detailed review of the interrogatories ^nd requests for production 
to which objections have been filed. 
5. That defendants1 motion for change of venue is 
taken under advisement. /v /O^^L /£&( 
DATED this ^ day of September, 1982. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
is 
By 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 7 
ROBERT D. SHERLOCK 
A* 
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Attorney for Defendants 
Tab 5 
STANLEY C. MANN, Pro Se 
P. O. Box 27317 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84127 
Telephone: (801) 278-9460 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAK)5, STATE OF UTAH 
\i. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
Plaintiff 
vs 
STANLEY C. MANN, QUEST 
PUBLISHING, INC. et al.. 
Defendant 
ANSWER TO OBJECTIONS 1 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FC 
ADMISSIONS AND MOTION 
COMPEL 
Civil No. C-81-8644 
Comes now defendant, Stanley Cj. Mann and states: 
*1 
th and/or his attorney, Ra] 
rlier in this matter to av< 
1. Plaintiff H. Wayne Wadswojq 
Christensen made false statements e 
giving direct answers to interrogatories. (Attachment #1.) 
2. The Requests for Admissions, without exception, are 
relevant and material to one of the specific allegations in th 
plaintiff Wadsworth's complaint. 
3. Answers to the request for admissions are only unduT 
burdensome in that they destroy Mr. Jwadsworth1s suit and expos 
as an illegal assassin of characterifor wrongful purposes. It 
not unduly burdomsome for Mr. Wadsworth to make the charges, 
therefore, it should not be unduly t>urdonsome to answer questi 
pertaining to those charges. 
254 
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4. If the plaintiff and his attorney are acting in good 
faith, answers to the questions (they acknowledge are relevant) 
should be answered. 
5. The requests are not vague and 4mbiguous if innocent of 
the actions related to the requests. According to Mr. Wadsworth, 
"Any innocent man would jump at the opportunity to clear his name." 
6. The only repetitious request woitild be where Mr. Wadsworth 
was guilty, of more than one action, relating to statements of his 
activities, made in the book "One Against The Storm". 
7. For the plaintiff, Wadsworth and his attorney, Ray R. 
Christensen to object on the basis of requests being "so voluminous 
and by their sheer number they amount to harassment and annoyance of 
Plaintiff" is ludicrus and not acting in jjood faith. The Plaintiff, 
Wadsworth, and his attorney, Ray R. Christensen, filed this suit, fo 
a malicious and wrongful purpose. They voluminously compiled a list 
of stores who had sold the book, "One Against the Storm" and then 
wrote a letter and threatened these contractual customers, which 
resulted in the destruction of two companlies. (Attachment #2). 
I respectfully request that Plaintilff Wadsworth be compelled 
to answer the "Request for Admissions" immediately. That the 
expenses to defendant be awarded for this intentional bad faith 
action on the part of Plaintiff Wadsworth) and his Attorney, Ray R. 
Christensen according to Rule 37(4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Tab 6 
STANLEY C. MANN, Pro Se 
P. O. Box 27317 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84127 
Telephone: (801) 278-9460 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
Plaintiff 
vs 
STANLEY C. MANN, QUEST 
PUBLISHING, INC., WESTERN 
MARKETING RESOURCES, INC., ET AL., 
Defendant's 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
CpLVil C-81-8644 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about the 10th day of November 1981, Plaintiff 
Wadsworth caused to be initiated in the Thijjrd Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, a Civil Action entitled H. Wayne 
Wadsworth vs Stanley C. Mann; Quest Publishing, Inc; Air terminal 
Gifts; Albertson's Inc; B. Dalton Book Seller; Bobco's Self Service 
Foods; Bobco's; Bob's Magazine Corner; Book Vault; Carr Stationary; 
Dick's Thriftway; Grand Central; Harmon's inc.; I.G.A. Kombo; Jordan 
Valley Books and Cards; Little Professor Book Center; Logos Book 
Store; Macey's Inc.' Reams Markets; Sam Weller's Bountiful Book 
Store; Servus Drug; Skaggs-Alpha Beta; S.M.C. Management Corp.; The 
Bus Stop; The Managzine Shop; The Wildflower; Waldenbooks; Z.C.M.I; 
Zions Book Store; and Does One through Fifty), Defendants. 
269 
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That said action seeks both legal and equitable relief 
against Defendant, Defendant's publishers ahd contractual customers, 
(various book stores, retail chains and outlet) in connection with 
the publication and distribution of a book authored by Defendant and 
entitled "One Against the Storm", which bool^  contains critical 
accounts of certain conduct of Plaintiff Waasworth and others in 
connection with the custody and trust of on£ David Wheeler, a minor 
grand-nephew of Defendant and actions of Waasworth in a suit filed 
for a Family Client for which he was found (jjuilty of malicious 
prosecution and assessed punitive damages by the jury, in addition 
to general damages. (See attachment #1.) 
The plaintiff Wadsworth did not at the time of filing of 
said complaint, or at any time thereafter skve any of the book 
stores, retail chains or outlets named in tfre action, with the 
exception of Quest Publishing Inc., and Western Marketing Resources, 
Inc., The Plaintiff has since dismissed all defendants from their 
action except Stanley C. Mann, Quest Publishing Inc., and Western 
Marketing Resources, Inc., (both companies are entities 
predominately owned by Stanley C. Mann and/dr his family. 
That subsequent to the filing of s&id Amended Complaint, 
said Plaintiff caused to be circulated to a^ Ll those named but 
unserved Defendants' a letter subscribed by Ray R. Christensen, said 
Plaintiffs counsel. By the terms of that letter the agreement of 
each named book store, chain and retail outlet to permanently 
refrain from stocking or selling the subject publication was 
solicited, regardless of the outcome of the suit, in return for said 
270 
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Plaintiffs agreement not to serve the Complaint or seek further 
relief. 
That at the time of filing of said Complaint, said Plaintiff 
did not intend to serve, and in fact instructed their counsel not to 
serve, the numerous named book stores, retail chains and outlets 
which had undertaken, or agreed to undertake the sale and distribu-
tion of Defendant's book, "One Against the Storm". 
Plaintiff's and his counsel, Ray R+ Christensen's 
objections to the Request for Admissions is completely non responsive 
and was not made in good faith. The objections are spurious and 
totally without merit. The objections are tiretextual inasmuch as; 
Plaintiff is aware that admissions, made in his personal 
testimony given under oath, convicts him of actions Plaintiff claimed 
were libelous and had sought relief for in his complaint. Plaintiff 
is also aware that denials of the same would constitute perjury on 
the part of the Plaintiff. Counselor's role as an advocate does not 
include knowingly making false claims for a client. Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure #11. 
The actions of Plaintiff, Wadsworth and/or his counsel, Ray 
R. Christensen in illegally communicating with Defendant Mann's 
contractual customers, making intimidating threats, and pressuring 
them to reframe from exercising their constitutional rights, was 
extortion and these actions had an adverse detrimental effect on the 
relationship enjoyed between Defendant Mann and his contractual 
customers, which resulted in the insolvency of Western Marketing 
Resources, Inc., Quest Publishing Inc., and Stanley C. Mann. 
27 i 
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Defendant's constitutional and Statutory Rights of Discovery 
have been denied in spite of numerous requests and the -expenditure of 
thousands of dollars. Defendant has been denied the rights necessary 
to defend himself, although these rights haye been granted to the 
Plaintiff and complied with by the Defendant^ .. 
All interrogatories propounded to Plaintiff relate to the 
defense against Plaintiff's complaint. The same is true of requests 
for documents and the Request for Admission^. Plaintiff, who 
brought this action over two (2) years and three (3) months agor 
still refuses to answer interrogatories or supply documents. 
The Plaintiff has done nothing to move this action towards 
trial. The deposition of Defendant, Stanlejy C. Mann was taken in 
February of 1982, a request by Plaintiff ma^ 3e for answers to 
interrogatories and request for documents which was complied with on 
October 18, 1982. 
Plaintiff has refused Defendant any discovery and supplied 
blatantly false statements to the court to justify his conduct. 
The allegations in the publication "One Against the Storm" 
are entirely true. The Plaintiff and his qounsel both know this and 
have purposely profaned the legal and judicial process and failed to 
prosecute their complaint. 
The Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for this 
reason so that counterclaims can be prosecuted. 
DATED THIS 3ft *-- day of (T/7/? /J*A'// 1984. 
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District Court of Salt Lak( 
to the provisions of Rule 9 (a) (2)., - Ul.R.C.P. , reserves the right 
to designate and serve said defendant^ by their correct names and 
to set forth their conduct relating to the Book when such infor-
mation becomes known, 
6. Plaintiff represented one Mark W. Wheeler in ar 
action against defendant Mann and hi^ wife to obtain the custody 
of Wheeler's son, David Mark Wheeler, after the death of the 
i 
child's mother, Joan Wheeler, entitled "In the Matter of: Davie 
Mark Newton Wheeler, a Minor" in the 
County, State of Utah, Probate No. 79-2 (hereinafter "Custody 
Action") during the period of approximately January 1, 1979 t< 
March 11, 1980. Plaintiff represented Mark W. Wheeler in a lega 
action against defendant Mann to remote him as trustee of certai 
insurance funds and other property belonging to the minor, Davi 
Mark Wheeler, of which Mann had taken possession following th 
death of Joan Wheeler, in favor of a corporate trustee or alter 
natively, to require an accounting and bonding of the defendan 
Mann, should he be retained as trustee, in an action entitled 
"David Mark Newton Wheeler, a Minor) Child, by and through hi 
Guardian Ad Litem, Mark Wayne Wheelejr, Plaintiff, versus Stanle 
C. Mann, Defendant" in the District Court of Salt Lake County 
State of Utah, Civil No. C-79-4063 '(hereinafter "Trust Action" 
during the period of approximately Ji4ne 22, 1979 to May 16, 198C 
Also, plaintiff Wadsworth represented Mark W. Wheeler and hi 
- 3 -
/ y / 
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Mann, Defendants", in the 
wife, Sylvi Wheeler, in a legal actioi) against defendant Mann and 
I 
his wife for interference with Mr. [Wheelerfs parental custody 
rights to David Mark Wheeler and for, damages resulting from th€ 
Manns1 alleged involvement in a shooting of Mark W. Wheeler in ar 
action entitled: "Mark W. Wheeler ancp Sylvi Wheeler, Plaintiffs/ 
vs. Stanley C. Mann and Louise C. 
United States District Court for th^ District of Utah, Centra. 
Division, No. C-79-0772W, (hereinaft4r "Tort Action") during th< 
i 
period of approximately December 28, 1979 to May 21, 1980. 
7. The Book refers to certain family relationship; 
existing between and among defendant Mann, Joan Wheeler, and he 
sister Shaunna Young, and other members and relatives of the Man 
family and to the legal actions above-mentioned. The Book wa 
first published by placing it for sal^ e in the State of Utah on o 
about the 26th day of November, 1980., 
8. The Book, published ir} paperback form, contains 
inter alia, the following notations cj>n the back cover: 
The facade of respectability of professional 
people - legal, judicial, political and reli-
gious - BARED. 
Her death brought such bizarre and incredible 
circumstances as to bogle (sic) the human 
mind. This could happen tolanyone. 
They were victims of le^al brutality and 
chauvinistic judges. 
The Author's Note contains the folloying statements: 
M 4 - 158 
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HOOKS APPENDIX—Continued 
persons trained m the law Id at 828, 97 
S Ct at 1498 
On October 6 1977, the district court 
granted the plaintiff interveners' applica 
tion for preliminary injunctive relief Af 
ter considering the State's proposed law 
library plan and expressing doubts as to its 
sufficiency, the district court preliminarily 
enjoined the State from permitting termi 
nation of the Pnson Project until final ap-
proval of a plan that would meet the 
State s constitutional duty The Fifth Cir 
cuit affirmed the district court's order 
granting the preliminary injunction, Hooks 
v Wainumght, 578 F 2d 1102, 1103 (5th 
Cir 1978), which remains m effect See 
Hooks v Wainumght, 536 FSupp at 1355 
The district court conducted an evidentia 
ry hearing in July \97S and again took the 
matter under advisement For the next 
three years, the district court held status 
conferences and encouraged the parties to 
reach an appropriate settlement During 
this period, the Florida Legislature con 
sidered enabling legislation that would 
have sanctioned a proposed plan under 
which state public defenders would have 
assisted indigent inmates m post-conviction 
and parole revocation proceedings and in 
actions challenging conditions of confine 
ment After the legislation died m commit 
tee in 1981^Jthe^ailie8^^me4a4e4^hat^ttr^ 
ther settlement negotiations were futile 
and requested the district court to enter an 
appealable order concerning the question 
of whether the assistance of attorneys, in 
some form, was an essential ingredient of 
Florida's attempt to comply with the man 
date of Bounds v Smith that inmates be 
afforded meaningful access to the courts 
Clara CARLUCCI, individually and as 
Special Administrator of the Estate of 
Carlucci, Alberto, Deceased, Plaintiff, 
P I P E R AIRCRAFT CORP., INC, a 
c o r p , Defendant, 
Francis A Anania, Appel lant 
No. 84-5576 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Eleventh Circuit 
Nov 12, 1985 
Attorney found to have acted in bad 
faith during discovery in wrongful death 
action was fined $10,000 under Civil Rule 
37 by the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida, James C 
Paine, J , and he appealed The Court of 
Appeals, Johnson, Circuit Judge, held tha t 
(1) evidence supported imposition of sane 
tion, (2) show cause order constituted ade-
quate notice, and (3) order imposing $10, 
000 fine was deficient for failing to detail 
basis for arriving at that sum ] 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded 
Fay, Circuit Judge, f i l e d ^ concurring 
^pihlbh 
1. Federal Civil Procedure fc=»1278 
All federal courts have power, by stat-
ute, by rule, and by common law, to impose 
sanctions against recalcitrant lawyers and 
parties litigant 28 U S C A § 1927, Fed 
Rules Civ Proc Rule 37(b), (b)(2), 28 U S 
CA 
2 Federal Courts «=>820. 870 
Standard of review for appellate court 
in considering appeal of sanctions under 
Civil Rule 37 is sharply limited to search 
for abuse of discretion and determination 
that findings of trial court are fully sup-
ported by the record Fed Rules Civ Proc 
Rule 37, 28 U S C A 
CARLUCCI v. PIPER AIRCRAFT CORP, INC 
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3 Attorney and Client «=>24 
Imposing sanctions under Civil Rule 37 
on attorney for defendant in wrongful 
death action was supported by sufficient 
evidence that attorney had wrongfully ter 
minatcd discovery production sessions and 
made conflicting representations to the 
court as to existence of investigative re-
ports prepared by his client Fed Rules 
Civ Proc Rule 37, 28 U S C A 
4. Federal Civil Procedure «=»1366 
Motion for relief from being required 
to give deposition- cannot be filed when 
parties are under direct order to continue 
deposition until completed Fed Rules Civ 
Proc Rule 30(d), 28 U.S C A 
5. Attorney and Client *=24 
I>ocal court rule governing proceedings 
against attorneys for misconduct was inap-
plicable to attorney against whom sanc-
tions under Civil Rule 37 were proposed to 
be imposed for his having acted in bad 
faith during discovery Fed Rules Civ 
Proc Rule 37, 28 U S C A , U S D i s t C t 
Rules S D Fla , Disciplinary Rule 5 
6 Attorney and Client «=>24 
Sanctions under Civil Rule 37 could be 
imposed on attorney found to have acted m 
bad faith during discovery even though 
underlying suit had been settled Fed 
Rules Civ Proc Rule 37, 28 U S C A 
JT^JUtorney^am^Chent «=>24^ 
Order to show cause why sanctions or 
disciplinary actions should not be imposed 
on attorney found to have acted in bad 
faith during discovery was adequate to ap-
prise attorney that only issue of sanctions 
was to be considered, despite contention 
that order did not inform attorney of all 
discovery conduct for which he would be 
called upon to answer, where relevant find 
mgs of bad faith conduct alleged against 
him had already been made, before order to 
show cause was issued, during course of 
discovery at tune when ample opportunity 
was afforded for attorney to be heard on 
factual matters being considered Fed 
Rules Civ Proc Rule 37, 28 U S C A 
* Honorable Walter E Hoffman U S District 
Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia sitting 
8 Attorney and Client «=24 
Imposition of $10,000 fine on attorney 
found to have acted in bad faith during 
discovery was deficient in that trial court 
failed to detail basis for arriving at that 
sum Fed Rules Civ Proc Rules 37, 37(b), 
28 U S C A 
9 Federal Civil Procedure «=1278 
Magnitude of sanctions awarded is 
bounded under Civil Rule 37 only by that 
which is reasonable m light of the circum 
stances Fed Rules Civ Proc Rule 37, 28 
U S C A 
10 Federal Civil Procedure «=1278 
Permissible purposes of sanction under 
Civil Rule 37 include compensating cou*t 
and other parties for added expense caused 
by abuBive conduct, compelling discovery, 
deterring others from engaging in similar 
conduct, and penalizing guilty party or at 
torney Fed Rules Civ Proc Rule 37, 28 
U S O A 
11 Federal Civil Procedure «=»1278 
In cases invoking sanction power of 
Cml Rule 37, district court must clearly 
state its reasons so that meaningful review 
may be had on appeal Fed Rules Civ Proc 
Rule 37, 28 U S C A 
-BJaekweW, Walker, ^ ray .^PoweTsr^hc l r^ 
& Hoehl James E Tnbble, Miami, Fla , for 
appellant 
Joseph W Womack, Miami Fla , A Ward 
Wagner, Mark Clark, Richard A Kupfer, 
West Palm Beach, F la , for plaintiff 
Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida 
Before FAY and JOHNSON Circuit 
Judges, and HOFFMAN *, District Judge 
JOHNSON, Circuit Judge 
Appellant Francis A Anania was attor 
ney for the defendant, Piper Airlines, in 
this consolidated wrongful death action, 
by designation 
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and was found by the court below to have 
acted in bad faith by inter alia, unilateral-
ly terminating document production ses-
sions ordered by the court and making 
conflicting representations as to the exist-
ence of certain documents The district 
court gave Mr Anania repeated warnings 
that his conduct was unacceptable and held 
out the possible imposition of sanctions in 
an attempt to secure his cooperation in the 
discovery process, but to no avail Follow-
ing settlement and entry of judgment for 
the plaintiff Carlucci on the claim underly-
ing, the trial court issued a show cause 
order directing Anania to appear at a hear-
ing to determine whether disciplinary ac-
tion or sanctions should be imposed under 
Fed R Civ P 37 After holding the hearing 
and considering affidavits submitted on his 
behalf, the district court entered an order 
assessing Anania a $10,000 fine 
On appeal Anania presents us with four 
issues He argues 1) that the procedure 
followed by the court below imposing sane 
tions was in violation of the Local Rules of 
Disciplinary Enforcement enacted by the 
District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida, 2) that the imposition of sanctions 
was in violation of Anania's due process 
rights as guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, 3) 
that the findings of misconduct by the 
court below were not supported by legally 
j^fficjejit^ejvideric^r^n44Hhat^he amounT 
of the sanction imposed was not supported 
by the record and was grossly excessive 
We find that as to issues 1), 2) and 3) 
there is no merit and we AFFIRM, as to 
issue 4) we must REVERSE AND RE-
MAND solely to require the district court 
to provide support for the amount of fine 
or cost imposed as required by Fed.R.Civ P 
37 
I. Facts 
The facts that gave rise to this appeal 
are convoluted, constituting almost 2600 
pages of record contained in twenty vol-
umes They accordingly must be set out at 
some length. 
The initial pleadings in this case were 
filed in December of 1978 The subject of 
the lawsuit was the 1976 crash, in Ireland, 
of a plane manufactured by the defendant 
Piper Aircraft In September of 1981 
Clara Carlucci, representing the estate of 
her husband Alberto, a victim of the crash, 
filed requests for the production of a varie-
ty of documents in Piper's possession relat-
ing to the controversy Piper, through 
Anania, objected to this request on several 
grounds, arguing that the documents were 
privileged and that production would im-
pose an excessive burden Carlucci filed a 
motion to compel discovery, and both sides 
submitted briefs on the issues to the dis-
trict court On December 31, 1981, the 
court, James C Paine, J, entered an order 
listing categories of documents that were 
appropriate for production Included were 
Piper's investigative reports Those for ac 
cidents that occurred after the 1976 Ireland 
crash were expressly exempted -from dis-
covery 
Subsequent disputes between counsel im-
peded the production of any documents un-
der the December 1981 order and required 
a hearing before Judge Paine on May 18, 
1982 At that hearing, Anania was asked 
whether Piper, his client, had produced the 
requested accident reports. Anania re-
plied 
Your Honor, I haven't produced any of 
the documents, because I was told such 
production would be unacceptablej^and 
yoiiriTOnor77Psee no practical reason to 
proceed with the compilation of all these 
documents if at some future time the 
plaintiff was going to reject it, and your 
honor was going to say go back and do it 
all over again 
At the end of the hearing, the court 
ordered Piper to produce the documents 
previously listed in the December 1981 oi% 
der Carlucci's counsel suggested meeting^ 
at Piper's plant in Lock Haven, Pennsylva-. 
ma, to examine the originals of the doc-^  
uments and make copies of those needed^ 
Piper agreed The court instructed Carluc^ 
ci's counsel to draft a proposed order cody 
i of the court's mstrugj taming the substance < 
tions to the parties at the hearing. ThW 
was done on June 2, with Piper submitting? 
a letter on June 6 opposing the requirtg 
ment that it produce the originals. Piggl 
CARLUCCI v. PIPER AIRCRAFT CORP., 
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proposed to produce copies, and to make 
originals available for inspection if the cop-
ies were illegible The district court's or-
der was signed on June 11, it required the 
production of originals Production was to 
begin on June 14 and to continue "until the 
production set forth herein is completed " 
Lock Haven 
Anania claims not to have received the 
court's order until the morning of June 14, 
the day in which discovery was to begin 
Copies of the requested documents had 
been assembled during the previous week, 
but the originals were scattered through-
out various offices at the Lock Haven 
plant, Anania claimed Piper was too short 
of manpower to devote additional personnel 
to the task of recollecting all of the onginal 
documents He offered to produce origi-
nals for copies which were not legible, but 
Carlucci was unsatisfied Attempts to 
reach Judge Paine telephonically failed, 
leading Anania to contact Judge Malcolm 
Muir of the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
Judge Muir agreed to resolve the dispute if 
Carlucci filed a written motion and brief 
and if Piper filed a reply brief within three 
days Carlucci did not pursue this course 
Anania terminated the Lock Haven dis-
covery session after only one day of pro-
^hrctioinmo^oT document marking by re-
turning to Miami without explanation He 
now argues that he terminated the produc 
tion session because he had underestimated 
the time necessary for production and had 
conflicting commitments in Miami He fur 
ther argues that Carlucci suffered no prej 
udice as a result of receiving copies at the 
Lock Haven session, since none were chal-
lenged on authenticity grounds when the 
originals were finally produced at later dis-
covery sessions in Chicago and West Palm 
Beach 
Based on the difficulties encountered at 
the Lock Haven session, Carlucci filed her 
first motion to impose sanctions and to 
strike Piper's answer Piper filed a re 
quest for a hearing and for a status confer-
' • Judge Campbell designated to sit in the South 
ern District of Florida was acting on behalf of 
Jucjge Paine in the latter s absence Subse 
ence No hearing was held, but a tran 
script of the Lock Haven session and bnefs 
from both parties were considered by the 
court On November 17, 1983, Judge Paine 
entered an order finding that both Piper 
and Anania had acted in bad faith in failing 
to comply with the June 11, 1982 discovery 
order 
Defendant's counsel shares, in large 
measure, the blame for noncompliance 
with this Court's order, for it was he who 
oversaw the proceedings in Lock Haven 
His conduct dunng that session deviated 
from what could be characterized as le 
gitimate and vigorous representation of 
one's client He was uncooperative, ver-
bally abusive to Plaintiffs' counsel, and 
obstructive, effectively thwarting the dis 
covery demanded by Court order This 
Court finds that he acted in bad faith • 
This order referred specifically to Anania's 
response to Judge Paine on May 18, 1982, 
concerning production of Piper's accident 
investigation reports, stating that Piper 
had not produced "any of the documents " 
The court found this response to be in 
conflict with a subsequent representation 
that no such reports existed, for the pnor 
representation was taken to imply that the 
documents did in fact exist 
The court ordered sanctions imposed on 
Piper, including the completion of produc 
tion of original documents at a time and 
place convenient to Carlucci's counsel A 
ruling on sanctions against Anania, as dis-
tinct from Piper, was expressly reserved, 
"pending Plaintiffs' submission of ex 
penses, including attorneys' fees, incurred 
as a direct result of the Lock Haven pro 
ceedmgs of June 14th and June 15th, 1982 " 
Carlucci did not file an accounting of these 
expenses 
Piper filed three separate motions in re 
sponse to Judge Paine's order (1) A mo 
tion for rehearing was filed on November 
28 This motion was denied by Judge Wil 
ham J Campbell, Senior United States 
Judge for the Northern District of Illinois ' 
quently Judge Campbell was desigmted by 
Judge Paine to hear all matters related to this 
controversy pending and future 
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(2) A motion for reconsideration was filed 
on November 30 It too was denied for 
failure to specify any factual e rror Judge 
Campbell reviewed the Lock Haven tran 
script and concluded that Judge Paine's 
findings were correct, he characterized the 
motion for reconsideration as a "delaying 
tac t ic" (3) An emergency motion for a 
stay, filed December 1, was heard and de 
nied by Judge Campbell This Court af 
firmed Judge Campbell's denial on appeal 
in an order entered on December 5, 1983 
Chicago 
A second production session begin in 
Chicago on December 5, 1981 It continued 
for ten davs, though not without dispute 
The parties filed several motions with 
Judge Campbell, who ruled on them 
promptly On December 16, another hear 
mg was held before Judge Prentice H Mar 
shall of the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois on Piper's 
motion to quash various subpoenas The 
motion was granted and according to Ana 
ma, the court directed that future dis 
covery disputes should be resolved in the 
District Court in Florida The court below 
charactemed this venue ruling as simply a 
"suggestion ' and further noted that Judge 
Marshall continued the heanng until De-
cember 21 
On December 21 AjiajuAiaileiiio-appeaF 
-b^fore^Tudge Marshall He had apparently 
returned to Florida following the December 
16 heanng, leaving Carluccfs attorneys, 
their expert witness, paralegals, and the 
court reporter waiting in Carlucci's attor 
ney's law office for discovery to resume 
On December 19 Piper had filed in the 
Southern District of Florida a motion for a 
protective order pursuant to Fed R Civ P 
30(d)2 claiming that a deponent, Mr Reed-
er, was being harassed by Carlucci's law-
yer to the detriment of the deponent's 
2 Rule 30(d) provides in relevant part 
At any time during the taking of a deposition 
on motion of i party or of the deponent and 
upon a showing that the examimtion is being 
conducted in bad faith or m such manner as 
unreasonably to annoy embarrass or oppress 
the deponent or party the court may 
order the officer conducting the examination 
to cease forthwith from taking the examina 
health Anania now further asserts that 
both he and the deponent were "the target 
of abusive comments and threats of arrest 
and even extradition " 
Carlucci learned via telegram sent on 
December 19 that the document production 
session had been terminated pursuant to 
Rule 30(d) In the telegram, Piper again 
offered to produce copies of the documents 
already assembled Carlucci's response 
was to file a second motion to strike Piper's 
answer 
On December 28, 1981, a pretrial confer 
ence was held before Judge Campbell Pip-
er's Rule 30(d) motion was denied A nil 
mg on Carlucci's motion to strike was de-
ferred And the court found that Anania 
had improperly terminated the Chicago pro-
duction session Regarding sanctions, the 
court stated 
Now, as to sanctions, full authority in 
that has been invested in me, and I will 
impose the sanctions outlined by Judge 
Paine as to costs and fees arising out of 
the Pennsylvania ill fated production ses-
sion 
However, I will reserve finding on 
those until after we dispose of all dis-
covery and maybe until after t h e ^ a s e ^ 
The deTendaiits have already been 
found in bad faith by Judge Paine 
Naturally that calls for sanctions 
When I consider that matter, I will con-
sider your conduct from here hence for-
ward, and advise defense counsel, who 
has already been held in bad faith, that 
[he] may purge [himself] of the necessity 
for further sanctions } 
I'll decide that when I see how you 
cooperate in the discovery process from 
now on 
tion Upon demand of the objecting party 
or deponent the taking of the deposition shall 
be suspended for the time necessary to make 
a motion for an order The provisions of 
Rule 34(a) [losing party in motion to compel 
discovery must pay prevailing p i r tys attor^ 
neys fees and expenses connected with mo-, 
tionl apply to the awird of expenses incurred
 % 
in relation to the motion 
CARLUCCI v PIPER AIRCRAFT C O R P , INC 1 4 4 5 
Cite a« 775 F 2d 1440 (1985) 
accident investigation reports and con 
eluded that Anania either had not in 
quired of Piper as to the existence of such 
reports bejore objecting to Carlucci s re 
quest for production in the first instance 
or had deliberately misled Judge Paine at 
the May 18 heanng for his reply then 
had implied that such documents did ex 
ist According to the court, either uould 
support 'the imposition of more severe 
sanctions " The order further criticized 
Anania for making 'false" and "con 
temptuous" representations to the court 
concerning Piper's repeated failure to 
produce the Bressler documents These 
representations uere to the ejfect that 
Piper uas not required to produce the 
documents and in any event, Carlucci 
could obtain ansuers to her interrogato 
nes from other sources 
Piper then settled the remaining issue of 
d images in the underlying lawsuit At a 
hearing before Judge Paine on April 10 the 
settlement was entered as a final judgment 
in the amount of $3 800,000 Anania s law 
partner then requested the court to retain 
jurisdiction so that Anania could present 
evidence concerning the adverse findings 
as to his conduct made during the dis 
^e<>v^ry^ttxnreedTrigs JudgeTTaine respond 
West Palm Beach 
Judge Campbell appointed a retired Flor 
ida state judge, James R Knott, as special 
master to oversee the completion of dis 
covery in West Palm Beach Document 
production resumed before Judge Knott on 
January 4, 1984 On the first day, Mr 
Reeder testified that he had still not in 
quired of Piper s other employees (one of 
whom had travelled to Ireland to assist the 
Irish government in making its official re 
port on this accident) whether they pos 
sessed documents falling within Carlucci s 
request Further disputes ciused produc 
tion to cease on January 10, after which 
Carlucci filed a third motion to strike 
At a hearing before Judge Knott on Jan 
uary 27, an issue arose as to the production 
of investigative reports called the "Bres 
sler documents" concerning an accident 
that occurred after the 1976 Ireland crash 
Piper argued that the Bressler documents 
were not discoverable under the order 
Judge Paine had entered on December 31 
1981, but stated that it was prepared to 
produce the documents if required to do so 
Judge Knott ordered that the documents be 
produced by February 6 On February 7, 
Piper appealed Judge Knott's order to the 
district court, which court dismissed the 
a£peaI-as-ir4volous—The^forjurrieTTt^lvel^ 
eventually produced in piecemeal fashion 
On March 7, Judge Knott filed a report 
detailing problems with Anania and noting 
Piper's "indifference" in lesponding to pro 
duction requests Anania filed an affidavit 
disputing Judge Knott s account on March 
23 Another hearing u a s held before 
Judge Campbell and briefs were filed by 
the parties * 
On March 30, 1984, Judge Campbell en 
tered an order granting Carlucci's motion 
to strike and found liability on the part of 
Piper Carlucci v Piper Aircraft Corp, 
Inc, 102 FRD 472 (SD Fla 1984) (Mem) 
He premised his order on findings that 
Piper had deliberately destroyed certain 
documents and along with Anania had 
engaged in conduct designed to obstruct 
the discovery piocess Ihe order refer 
enced Anania s ansuer to Judge Paine's 
question of May 18, 1982, concerning the 
ed that this matter would remain open af 
ter final judgment and he noted 
It does seem to me it is fair to have some 
sort of a heanng and an opportunity for 
[Anania] to explain I regard it as a 
pretty serious matter, and there, hopeful 
ly, are explanations that will at least 
mitigate the situation to some extent 
On April 26, Judges Pame and Campbell 
entered an order to show cause why sane 
tions or disciplinary action should not be 
imposed on Anania The show cause order 
specifically referred to the November 17 
1983 and March 30, 1984 orders of the 
court finding Anania to have acted in bad 
faith Anania filed a motion m response 
arguing that the show cause order had not 
informed him of the specific conduct under 
review and thus denied him procedural due 
process under the Fifth Amendment Fur 
ther, assuming formal charges would be 
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filed, Anania requested that they he heard 
hy a district judge who had not previously 
been involved in the underlying lawsuit 
Anania testified at a hearing before 
Judges Paine and Campbell on May 4 and 
submitted additional evidence by way of 
affidavits. His testimony comprised an at-
tempt to explain his prior conduct as ac-
ceptable under the circumstances, which he 
alleged included comparable conduct on the 
part of Carlucci's attorney. He requested 
that the court remove fiom its prior orders 
the references to his conduct as having 
been in bad faith. 
Following the hearing, Anania filed a 
motion lo vacate the show cause order and 
limit the purpose of the hearing that had 
aheady been held Ho alleged that the 
show cause order had not been entered in 
accordance with Ride 5 of the IiOC.il Rules 
of Disciplinary Enforcement for the South 
ern District of Florida He also restated 
the procedural duo process claims previous-
ly asserted in his response to the show 
causo order. Both parties filed briefs ad-
dressing these and other issues. 
On .lime 28, 1981, Judges Paine and 
Campbell entered an order rejecting both 
Anania's procedural due process claims and 
the applicability of I/ical Rule 5. The court 
then considered and rejected Anania's at-
tempts to explain his past conduct as not 
having been in bad faith. Some of the 
i^xptaliaTions^were found to lie inconsistent 
with or otherwise lacking support in the 
record. Other explanations were found to 
be incredible. The court concluded that 
Anania had obstructed discovery and violat-
ed its orders. Citing deterrence as the 
justification and finding it "obvious" that 
Anania had been paid a "considerable" fee 
for his services in representing Piper, the 
court assessed costs and attorney's fees in 
the amount of $10,000. Finally, the court 
found the record to be "insufficient" to 
determine whether Anania had been in-
volved in or had knowledge of Piper's in-
tentional destruction of requested doc-
uments. Believing further inquiry to be 
warranted, however, the court referred the 
matter to the Grievance Committee for the 
Southern District of Florida. 
II. Analysis. 
In reviewing this case on appeal we find 
that the true issues of consequence have 
become confused The court below has 
assessed costs against Anania under Rule 
37, but has framed its order as a defense of 
the power of a federal court to impose 
sanctions. Anania apparently does not con-
test the authority of the court to do what it 
did; he asks rather that certain procedural 
requisites be followed. The attorneys on 
both sides in their briefs seem predomi-
nantly interested in trading pejorative and 
vituperative epithets when the adequacy of 
the process tendered by the district court is 
the important question. We attempt to 
clarify the issues and resolve this appeal by 
considering first whether courts have the 
authority, by whatever means derived, to 
impose snncHous; second, whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the imposi-
tion of sanctions on Anania; third, if sanc-
tions are warranted, whether they were 
imposed consistent with due process; and 
fourth, if there is substantial evidence of 
attorney misconduct, whether the amount 
of costs assessed by the district court was 
arrhed at by means consistent with the 
requirements of law. 
A. Sanctions and Court Power. 
I l l It is beyond peradventure that all 
by rule, and by common law, to impose 
sanctions ngainst recalcitrant lawyers and 
parties litigant. Congress enacted 28 U.S. 
C.A. § 1927 (1985) permitting the court to 
impose personal liability on an attorney for 
"excels costs, expenses, and attorneys' 
fees reasonably incurred" where that attor-
ney "unreasonably and vexatiously" multi-
plies the pleadings in any case. Beyond 
this, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide, in Rule 37(b), that failure by a 
party or his counsel to make or cooperate 
in court ordered discovery may, at the trial 
court's discretion, lead to the imposition of 
sanctions of several sorts. Relevant to this 
nppeal is the final clause of Rule 37(b)(2) 
providing for assessment of fees and ex-
penses resulting from the failure of a party 
CAREUCC1 v. PIPER AI 
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or his attorney to abide by court orders to 
produce documents.-1 
Even absent explicit legislative enact 
merit, deeply rooted m the common law 
tradition is the power of any court to 
"manage its affairs [which 1 necessarily in 
chides the authority to impose reasonable 
and appropriate sanctions upon errant law-
yers practicing before it." Flaksa v J Attic 
River Marine (yonstinction Co, 389 F 2d 
885, 888 n. 10 (5th Cir ), cert, denied, 392 
U.S. 928, 88 S.Ct 2287, 20 L FA 2d 1387 
(1908); accotd, Roadway Erpuss Inc. r 
Piper, 447 U S . 752, 701, 100 S.Ct 2155, 
2403, 65 LFd.2d 488 (1980) ("There are 
ample grounds for recognizing, however, 
that in narrowly defined circumstances fed 
era! courts have inherent power to a^se^s 
attorney's fees against counsel"); I,ink r 
Wabash R. Co., 370 US . 020, 030-31, 82 
S.Ct 1380, 1388 89, 8 I, Ed.2d 734 (190?) 
(courts have "inherent power" to dismiss 
an action sua sponfc as a sanction in order-
to "achieve the orderly and expeditious dis-
position of cases"); 4 \V Blackstone, Com-
mentaries, *285-*80 (170)5) (noting power to 
discipline for "rude and contumelious beha 
viour" that "must necessarily he as ancient 
as the laws themselves. For laws without 
a competent authority to secure their ad-
ministration from disobedience and con 
tempt would be vain and nugatory") R)if 
see, Societe Internationale Pour Paitic-
ipations Industi idles el Com met cwlr<t, 
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207, 78 S.Ct. 
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and before ;\ partial tubunal, he was found 
to have acted in bad faith 
B Substantiality of Kudence of Bad 
Faith 
{21 The Supreme Court has stated in 
language plain and firm that the standard 
of review for an appellate court in consider-
ing an appeal of sanctions under Rule 37 is 
sharply limited to a search for abuse of 
discretion and a determination that the 
findings of the trial court are "fully sup-
ported by the record." National Hockey 
League v Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 
427 U S . 079. 042 13, 90 S.Ct 2778, 2780-
81, 49 L E d ? d 747 (1970) (per curiam); 
A-tcc Steel Co. v Florida Steel Coip, 091 
F 2d 480, 482 (11th Cir 198?) (pet cimam ), 
cett denied, 100 U S . 1040, 103 S.Ct. 1433, 
75 L E d 2d 792 (1983); Gnffhi v. Alu-
minum (yo>/) of America, 501 F 2d 1171, 
1172 (5th Cir 1977) {per cunam) The 
Court in National Hockey League admon-
ished the Courts of Appeals not to exhibit 
"lenity" even in the faro of "outright dis 
missal as a sanction for failure to comply 
with a discovery order" because Rule 3 7 
sanctions were designed "not merely to 
penalize tho^e whosp conduct mav be 
deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to 
defer those who might be tempted to such 
conduct in the absence of such a deter 
r e n t " When reviewing allegations that 
-tbe—fimtmgs of a district court are clea^dy-
erroneous we are guided by the language 
of National Hockey League and by the 
definition provided by the Supreme Court 
in United States v. United States Gypsum 
Co, 333 U.S 301, 395, 08 S Ct 525, 541, 92 
LEd, 740 (1918), that a finding is clearly 
erroneous if "the reviewing court on the 
entire evidence is left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed." 
[3J Here, a careful review of the record 
as a whole shows no reversible error on the 
question of misconduct. In fact the record 
evppn«rs, including attorney's f c s . caused hy 
the failure, unless the court finds that the fail 
u ie was substantially justified or that other cir-
cumstances make an award of expenses unjust " 
1087, 1093, 2 LEd 2d 1255 (1958) (Rule 37 
is the exclusive source of authority for 
sanctions in discovery abuse) {obiter dic-
tum ) . 
All of these bases, relied upon b\ the 
court below, support its assertion of power 
to impose sanctions for bad faith conduct 
during discovery But Anania challenges 
the court's authority to impose a sanction 
only indirectly. He argues rather that 
there is insufficient evidence on the record 
to support a finding of bad faith conduct 
and that proper procedural protections 
were denied when, without adequate notice 
3. "In lieu of any of the foregoing orders oi in 
addition thereto, the court shall require the par 
ty failing to obey the order or the attorney 
advising him or both to pay the reasonable 
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is legion with Anama's misconduct and bad 
faith A few examples suffice to encapsu 
late the record presented 
(1) Anania was found to have wrongfully 
terminated the Lock Haven discovery pro 
duction sessions He claimed good faith 
disputes remained about the scope of the 
requests for production when he decided to 
terminate this session and argued that on 
short notice the burden of producing doc 
ument originals was e x c e s s i - ^ Yet the 
district court had already resolved the dis 
pute over originals expressly in Carlucci's 
favor, and Anania did not make even a 
"best effort" attempt to comply He even 
went so far as to instruct a witness "not to 
respond to questions regarding the avail 
ability of originals" when in fact the doc 
ument custodian had admitted that produc 
tion of the originals "would only take a few 
minutes " On more than one occasion the 
court had considered the scope of the re 
quest and ordered Piper to produce original 
documents for discovery Instead Anania 
flew off to meet "prior commitments" in 
Miami The district court properly found 
that the burden was on Anania to seek 
relief from the court in the event of a 
scheduling conflict He is "not free to 
ignore the Order [of the district court] and 
to impose his own time constraints on the 
^proceeiiings^" X>4^1ei^>fUhe^istric^Gourtr 
Record Excerpts at 182, accord, Guidry v 
Continental Oil Co, 640 F 2d 523, 533-34 
(5th Cir), cert denied, 454 U S 818, 102 
S Ct 96, 70 L Ed 2d 87 (1981), In re Sut 
ter, 543 F 2d 1030, 1034-35 (2d Cir 1976) 
14] (2) Anania likewise wrongfully ter 
minated the production session held under 
court order in Chicago He contends first 
that the Rule 30(d) motion was filed in good 
faith to protect his deponent from the 
abuse of Carlucci s counsel and second that 
he was directed by Judge Marshall to file 
that action in the District Court in Florida 
Even if we were to accept the first excuse 
that his failure to appear was justified be 
cause he was in Florida seeking relief un 
Anania correctly argues that an objection to 
production may be based on the ground of 
excessive burden without the defendant first 
having to undertake an exhaustive search for 
the requested documents But here the district 
der Rule 30(d), there is no authority of 
which we are aware holding that a Rule 
30(d) motion can be filed when the parties 
are already under a direct court order to 
continue the deposition until completed 
The Supreme Court articulated the proper 
procedure to be followed in instances such 
as this in Manes? v Meyer?, 419 U S 449, 
458, 95 S C t 584 590 42 L Ed 2d 574 
(1975), where it held that "all orders and 
judgments of court must be complied with 
promptly If a person to whom a court 
directs an order believes that order is incor 
rect the remedy is to appeal, but absent a 
staj to comply promptly with the order 
pending appeal" Accord, Link, 370 U S 
at 633 82 S C t at 1390 San Antonio 
Telephone Co v American Tel & Tel 
Co, 529 F 2d 694 694 (5th Cir) {per cu 
nam ), cert denied, 429 U S 999, 97 S Ct 
527, 50 LEd 2d 610 (1976) There was no 
stay here, and that obtainable under Rule 
30(d) was properly brought before Judge 
M irshall who had retained jurisdiction over 
this matter by continuing the hearing to 
December 21 r 
As to the second justification, we frankly 
find it incredible that Anania could so inter-
pret the status of the Illinois action when 
several other motions had been heard in 
Jurlge Marshall's court and when Judge 
Mars l r a l l ^h^aTTnl^ f^D^^ 
had been expressly continued until the fol 
lowing week Judge Marshall was there, 
CaWucci s counsel likewise Only Anania 
failed to appear 
(3) Anania made conflicting representa-
tions to the court below as to the existence 
of investigative reports While Anania de-
nies this, it is clear from the record, and 
from Judge Campbell's order of March 3QK 
1984, that such misleading statements were 
made Anania first answered that the re-
quested reports did exist, but he objected 
to their production on grounds of work 
product privilege and burdensomeness 
He likewise told the court that the doc-
uments existed at a hearing before Judge 
court did not find bad faith conduct because an 
exhaustive search had not been undertaken 
Rather the finding was based on the failure of 
Anania to undertake any reasonable search tf*„ 
all before filing the objection 
CARLUCCI v PIPER AIRCRAFT CORP, 
Cite as 775 F J d 1440 (1985) 
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Paine on May 18 1982 Later Anania stat 
ed "unequivocally" that the documents did 
not exist He seizes upon this later denial 
as evidence that the court was not misled 
because he then stated clearly that no re 
ports existed But the issue of whether 
reports did exist was still an open question 
at that time The court's statements sim 
ply set out the conflict and did not resolve 
it It was not until March 30 1984 that 
the court was able to d( termine that the 
documents in question had in fact existed 
and had been destroyed 
In short, on the entire evidence we are 
not "left with the definite and firm convic 
tion that a mistake has been committed ' as 
required by US Gypsum In fact we are 
left with little doubt but that the court 
below could properly have reached no other 
conclusion If this case is not a paradigm 
of the abuse that sanctions under Rule 37 
are to correct we would have great diffi 
culty hypothesizing one that is 
C The Requirement of Due Process 
Anania advances three claims that he 
was denied the right to due process of law 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution He argues 
first that the court below failed to follow 
^he^^devant^oeal—ru^esHtoi^th^^SoiittieTn 
District of Florida second that when im 
posing sanctions after settlement of the 
underlying controversy the court should re 
fer possible sanctions to an independent 
body, and third that he did not receive 
notice adequate to inform him that his 
rights were being adjudicited and precisely 
what matters were to bo considered in mak 
ing that adjudication We consider each in 
turn 
5 Local Rule 5 p-ovides in relevant part 
A The court will utilize its Grievance Com 
mittee as established and accordinglv act 
upon the reports and recommendations of 
that committee provided that this rule shall 
in the discretion of the Court constitute an 
alternate method of processing allegations of 
misconduct 
B When misconduct or allegations of mis 
conduct which if substantiated would war 
rant discipline on the part of an attorney 
admitted to practice before this Court shall 
come to the attention of a Judge of this Court 
1) The Local Rules 
[5J The United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida has prom 
ulgated rules of discipline to govern the 
conduct of attorneys appearing in practice 
before it Such rules operate parallel to, 
but not inconsistent with, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure Fed R Civ P 83 
In essence, Anania argues that he is being 
disciplined by the district court and accord 
ingly has a right under Local Rule 5 to 
have his alleged misconduct considered b> 
either of the optional mechanisms set forth 
in that Rule 5 Both avenues provide for 
30 day notice of such proceedings and, 
when the compl tint is initiated bv a judge 
based on a case before him hearing before 
a three judge panel, none of whom was 
otherwise involved with the underljing 
case For Anania the trial court followed 
neither of these requirements 
Though Mr Anania has everv right to 
expect and receive notice and a fair adjudi 
cation of his case we find th it the local 
rules are not applicable in this case Prop-
er characterization of the action below, 
which was based on a bad faith obstruction 
of discovery rather than a breach of the 
ethical norms governing the attorney-client 
relationship traditionally proscribed by a 
UTjfes^TOTiat^o^e^Tu^ltes^hls^TteaT LocaT 
Rule 5 does clearly direct the convening of 
a Grievance Committee or appointment of a 
"special prosecutor ' of sorts in "processing 
allegations of misconduct " But we must 
rely upon Local Rule 4 to give meaning to 
Local Rule 5 for it is the former that 
provides a definition of the operative term 
"misconduct" as those acts which 'violate 
the Code of Professional Responsibility' 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida fi 
whether b \ complaint or otherwise and the 
applicable procedure is not otherwise nnnda t 
cd by th^se Rules the Judge shall refer the 
matter to counsel or investigation and the 
prosecution of a form il disciphnai-v proceed 
ing or the formulation of such other recom 
mendation as may be appropriate 
6. Rule 4 B provides that 
Acts or omissions by an attorney admitted to 
practice before this Court which violate 
the Code of Piofessional Responsibility 
adopted by this Coutt shall constitute miscon 
duct and shall be grounds for discipline 
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Because the Florida Code of Professional 
Responsibility is not extant in the record 
below, and because Anania cites no specific 
provisions of that Code in defense of his 
chim that his conduct is of the sort gov-
erned by the Code, we are forced to extra 
polate from another provision of the local 
rules, Rule 12, providing that the rules of 
discipline are not properly construed as de-
nying the courts "such powers»sj are nee 
essary for the Court to maintain control 
over proceedings conducted before it " 7 
We hold that implicit in this reservation of 
power for the district court is a rejection of 
Anama's contention that the requirements 
of Local Rule 5 govern 
We note further that a decision contrary 
would violate the similar reservation of 
Federal Civil Rule 83, which rule provides 
that local rules may not be "inconsistent 
with these rules " We think it clear from 
the firm language of the Supreme Court in 
a number of cases that the power of feder 
al courts to curb abuses of the discovery 
process is not to be hamstrung by the 
additional procedural burdens of local rules 
if such rules would have the effect of limit-
ing the force and effect of Federal Rule 37 
Roadway Express, 447 U S at 763-64, 100 
S J ^ at 2462-63, National Hockey 
Uaglie7^2^Yirmr^S Ct^tT278l7 
Link, 370 U S at 632, 82 S Ct at 1389 
2) Sanctions After Settlement 
Anama's second due process claim is de-
rived from the first and fails for the same 
reason He argues that the policy an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in cases like 
Roaduay Express and National Hockey 
League is not implicated here because 
those cases contemplated a strict apphca 
tion of Rule 37 in ongoing litigation so as 
to facilitate or compel compliance with dis 
covery orders Such concerns would be 
inapposite here, he argues, because the un-
derlying action has been settled, according-
The Code of Professional Responsibility 
adopted by this court is the Code of Profes 
sional Responsibility adopted by the highest 
court of the state in which this Court sits 
7. Local Rule 12 reads in full 
ly obedience to the trial court's orders 
would not be furthered by disposing of the 
case under Rule 37 
This fails for three reasons First, it 
squarely contradicts the language of the 
Supreme Court in National Hockey 
League, 427 U S at 643, 96 S Ct at 2781, 
where the Court made clear that sanctions 
for discover} violations serve "not merely 
to penalize those whose conduct may be 
deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to 
deter those who might be tempted to such 
conduct in the absence of such a deter-
rent " (emphasis supplied) We must en 
force Rule 37 sanctions "diligently" 
Roadway Express, 447 U S at 763, 100 
SCt at 2462 If the rule is not so en 
forced, "it might well be that these respon-
dents would faithfully comply with all fu 
ture discovery orders in this case But 
other parties to other lawsuits would fee] 
freer th in we think Rule 37 contemplates 
to flout other discovery orders of other 
district courts " National Hockey League, 
427 U S at 643, 96 S Ct at 2781 (emphasis 
m original), Aztec Steel, 691 F 2d at 482 
It is neither necessary nor appropriate for 
an infenor federal court to engraft upon 
Rule 37 a procedural mechanism more de-
^flandmg^than^ 4hat which—the—Supreme^ 
Court has deemed adequate to both guar-
antee due process and vindicate the policy 
underlying that rale
 u 
[6] Second, we previously held in Gui~ 
dry, 640 F 2d at 534, that the district court 
properly assessed a $500 fine against coun-
sel for discovery violations after the record 
on the underlying case was closed and the 
appeal was already filed The posture of 
the underlying claim was itself irrelevant 
to the decision of the trial court to impose 
sanctions We recognize the correctness of 
that holding and reaffirm today the 
breadth of discretion we afford our district 
courts to deal with attorney misconduct m 
Nothing contained in these Rules shall be 
construed to deny to this Court such powers, 
as are necessary for the Court to maintain 
control over proceedings conducted bfor* S 
such as proceedings for contempt under liuc 
18 of the United States Code or under Rule « 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-, 
CARLUCCI v. P IPER AIRCRAFT C O R P , INC. 
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ways they deem best suited to each in 
stance of nonfeasance 
Anama's argument fails on a third level 
By making the status of the underlying 
action controlling over who may adjudicate 
allegations of discovery misconduct (that is 
by the federal judge hearing the case or by 
the special three judge pinel) and wh it 
standards will inform their deliberations 
(Federal Rule 37 or some local provision) 
the effect is to bind the hands of the trial 
court in an area where the Supreme Court 
h i s ruled we should promote maximum 
flexibility It would deprive the district 
judge of the option to defer a ruling on 
sanctions so as to allow the errant attorney 
an opportunity to "purge" himself of the 
wrongdoing, or at least to mitigate his pen 
alty, by henceforth cooperating in dis 
covery 8 Anama's argument would force a 
court to choose between imposing an ippro 
pnate sanction for each instance of bad 
faith discovery conduct at the time it oc 
curred, certifying each episode to a griev 
ance panel, or waiting until the underlying 
litigation has been completed and then for 
warding the entire matter to the grievance 
committee or appointed counsel for investi 
gation and a hearing before judges not 
8 Indeed such an opportunity was afforded 
here it was only on Carlucci s third motion to 
strike in the face of recalcitrance by Piper and 
by Anania that the district court finally had 
enough and entered the order to show cause 
9 The only case with which we are fauulnr that 
might be taken to support A m m a s position is 
Untied States v Vague 697 F 2d 805 (7th Cir 
1983) That case involved the refusal of an 
attorney to lower his apparently exorbitant fee 
upon order of the trial court during sentencing 
proceedings The court and the attorney 
sparred for seven! weeks over the fee with the 
court ultimately holding the attornev in con 
tempt The Seventh Circuit reversed reasoning 
that the combination of prosecutorial and adju 
dicative functions in the trial judge violated the 
due process guarantee of an impartial tribunal 
Rather that court held the matter should have 
been referred to an independent prosecutor un 
der local rules 
We find Vague distinguishable because it in 
volved a disciplinary inquiry entirely separate 
in subject matter from the underlying action 
The exorbitant fee question and the facts mate 
rial to that issue were altogether different from 
t\«,- - „i _ j „ ,u._ „«„ „.„„ „ „ A«„ c „ . , 
previously imolved, with the expense and 
delay concomitant Were we so to hold we 
would be transforming most citations of 
misconduct during discovery into full 
fledged disciplinary proceedings This 
would mire trial courts m endless deliys 
while panels were constituted to consider 
potential viohtions of Rule 37 with the 
attendant result contrary to the clear hold 
ing of the Supreme Court of discouraging 
trial courts from imposing sanctions in the 
first place Further, it would cast into 
doubt the power of a district court to hold 
contempt proceedings during the course of 
litigation since such proceedings cirry pen 
alties more severe than those imposed in 
discovery matters Clearly this is not what 
the Supreme Court intended, nor wh it we 
would find desirable in the courts of this 
Circuit, nor even what Local Rule 12 appre 
hends ' 
3) Right to Notice and Hearing 
[7] Anama's third due process claim is 
that he was not afforded constitutionally 
adequate notice of the charges against him 
or given adequate opportunity to defend 
himself against these allegations He sug 
gests to us In re Ruffalo, 390 U S 544 88 
S Ct 1222, 20 L Ed 2d 117 (1968), as setting 
forth the constitutional requisites,10 and ar 
Sending the matter to the local committee in 
volved no overlap of judicial resources By 
contrast here the resolution of the numerous 
discovery disputes and the decision to impose 
sanctions on the appellant even after the under 
Iving action had been settled were inextricably 
intertwined Further the Vague case involved 
contempt sanctions which have historically re 
quired greater due process protection since they 
often carry criminal as opposed to civil penal 
ties Even if the case could not be distin 
guished we find it unpetsuasive because it has 
policy implications that we think arc ill advised 
and is contrary to binding precedent 
10 In re Ruffalo involved a disciplinary action 
against an attorney accused of soliciting clients 
The original charge enumerated twelve distinct 
counts of barratry At a hearing however a 
thirteenth count was added after the attorney 
defendant had presented his defense The state 
board sanctioned the attorney on the thirteenth 
count The Supreme Court reversed holding 
that the charge must be known before the 
proceedings commence Thev become a trap 
when after thev are underway the charges are 
amended on the basis of testimony of the ac 
r. e-A ion ii q -,t «;<;i RR <; c\ it \r>t> 
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gucs t in t tho district courts show m i i p 
order did not inform hun of all of tho 
drcovery conduct for which ho would he 
c ill( d upon to mswer He points to sever 
i l findings m the district court s fin i) order 
th it lie clums were not expressly men 
honed in the show cinse order h iv ing him 
unprepared to contest them i t the finil 
heiring before ludgos Pune and Cimi bell 
Ihe court below chtncreri7es the 'find 
i n g s ' it issue i s 'obsorvitions ' mide in 
re ponse to An uu i s ittc mpt to e xplun his 
ictions as hiving been founded in good 
futh 
Rulfnlo r not controlling bote The dis 
tmction between discover) sinctions mrl 
formal disc lphmrv, proceedings t int forced 
us to re j c fr A n m i i q c him under the loe d 
rule1* hi ewise compels us to reject this 
chmi A n i n n s irgument ipnore s the fict 
th i t the reh v m t findings of bid f nth con 
due t alleged ig i in s t him hid ilready been 
mule epnte some tune before the order to 
show CIU«*P wis r s u t d The findings were 
mide during the course of discover} in the 
Orders of November 17 198? of December 
28 1981 m d of M \rch 10 1984 The 
record reflee ts t in t in e ich cise imple 
opportunity was iffoidcd for Anini i to be 
b e n d on the f u t u i l mittcrs being con 
side red Briefs were filed before the order 
of November 17 i pretrial confer* nee w r 
held before the December 28 order briefs 
were filed and a heiring wis held before 
A^Ter^farrrr^O^oreler The express purpose 
of the fmil heiring was only to consider 
the issue of ^auction? It wis not to con 
stitute i formil chsnphniry proceeding to 
consider the ch irges dt noio The fair 
notice reejmrement of Rvffolo ipplies of 
course, to each of the district courts prior 
1! likewise in Gtudtj we upheld sanctions un 
der Rule 17 where the attorney cmsr-d uuncces 
sary discovery er{ ens'* even while no technical 
vi ilition of any pailiculai rule wis made by 
Cuidry s r o u n d lw ausc the nnp is i t im of 
sanctions m this case was in keeping with the 
s u n t of the rules 640 T 2d it 511 If sane 
tions n n y be imp >sed even absent -\ technical 
violitio then clearly in a ease* such as this 
where counsels misconduct wa« recognized by 
the roiut nri three s par ate oera ions theie can 
l e n ) question but that the ihtc pi en ess reqiiin 
in ut of adequate notice was rue. t Se ah i 
Maigolcs v Johis 587 F 2d 885 888-89 (7th 
inquiries from which resulted the findings 
of bid futh conduct Notice necessary 
w is given by the court incident to e ich o£ 
those proe eeehngs Anann does not con 
test the ideejuicy of the notice in the e i rh 
er proceedings but directs his argument to 
the fmil heiring held before the imposition 
of the $10 000 sinction 
In we iphing the ideejuicy of notice and 
he inng in the finil iction we ire guided by 
the holding in Link 170 U S at 612 82 
S ( t i t U89 where the Court upheld the 
sinction of dismiss\1 of an iction even m 
the f ice of cl urns of insufficient notice and 
opportunity for a heiring ' [FJvery order 
entered without notice m d i preliminary 
idvorsiry heiring [does not I of fe nd due 
prex ess Iheideriuuv, of notice md heir 
ing respecting proceedings that m i \ if feet 
i party s rights turns to a considerable 
extent on the knowledge which the circum 
stances show such pir ty mi} be taken to 
hive of the consoe]ucnces ol his own con 
duet ' " 
We find it cleir from the record that 
A n u u i wis given the full mei^ure ind 
more of process due Fven though find 
ings of bid filth conduct in discovery hid 
aire uly been mide the district court p ive 
Annua in idditionil opportunity to be 
he ird before imposing sinctions I h e 
show cause order refeienced the pnor find 
ings of bid filth conduct in the orders 
seived the issue of sinctions for i later 
date) md March 30 1984 (which h id an 
nounced the possibility of 'more severe 
sine horn ) (iivcn the protracted history 
of discovery in this cise ind the repeated 
findings of bad faith, we find that the show 
Cir 197R) (district court refused to p n n t eviden 
tiarv heaimg reparduig sanctions for failure to 
follow court discover directive notinp the 
voluminous factual d tad provided to the dls 
trict coutt th co ut of appeals held thai 1 full 
hearing with oral arpument was not requited 
because it would have been cumulative ) Ed 
gar \ Shufhtcr 548 T 2d 770 773 (8th Cir 
1977) (trial court should enter in order to 
show cause and hold a bearing if deemed nee 
e sary to dHcitninc whether assessment of 
costs and atforniy fees or even an attorneys 
citation for contempt would be just and 
effective sanction ) 
C A R I A K U v PIPI It A! 
Cltra*77"iF.2d 
ciuse notice wis ideepnte to inform Ani 
m i of the issues to be decided it the find 
heiring under the link st md ird No 
' c b i r g e s ' need hive been specified Ihe 
sole issues to be decided were the form ind 
measure of s Mictions Under these circum 
stances there is no merit to Anini \ s i rgu 
ment t i n t the e i rher orders weie made 
emite 
D Uw $10 000 Santtwn 
IRJ Mr A n i n n s fmil contention is th it 
in is^essmp ipunst him the $10000 <noc 
turn the court b< lo\ filled to pi tee on the 
record evidence sufficient to c xplun how it 
irrived i t t in t figure i s furlv, re flective of 
the costs entiile d in An mi i s greiss misc on 
duet Ihe re fore the fine is he irgtu s 
i rb i tnr} m d b ise d on unsuppoitcd is 
sumptions Finding the order b» low to be 
deficient m t i n t the district coutt fuh el to 
detail the b isis fe>r nr iv ing i t the sum of 
$10 000 we igroe ind on this ground ilone 
we reverse ind remind 
[9,101 Ihe t rn l coutt imposed situ 
tions under the fin \1 cliuse of Fedet il Rule 
-17(b) which provides t in t i court m iv 
properly pen ihze uncooper itive i t tornevs 
or pirtios h t igmt in chscoveiy pioteedings 
by requiring the pigment of re ison ibh 
expenses m\ \ui\mg attorney s \>es c wv^ evv. 
bv the fulure " The s t ind i rd of re 
view m cises of this sort is ibuse of discre 
tion I h e migmtude of sinctions iwarded 
i sTounded muITl^RuTe7 'il onl) b> tint-
which is ' r e i s o n a b l e ' in light of the cir 
cumstmces 1 2 Permissible purpeses of 
sine tion include 1) eompemsitmg the court 
and other pirties for the idded expen-e 
ciused b> the ibusive conduct 2) compel 
hng discovery 3) deterring others from 
engiging in sunihr conduct ind 4) penil 
l/ing the guilt} pirtv. or ittornev, Road 
vni/Expyi^ 447 U S i t 7bt 100 S 11 i t 
2463 National Ho<key Uagui 427 U S 
12 We exprc slv decline Ananias invitation lo 
permit consideration of die prr* m l s i lua luu 
of one subject to p<*nalt> in dctcrminuiF the 
approprnte sanction We find no evil nee in 
the Federal Rules in the relevant statutory en 
actments or m the case h w t ) supP( st tint it 
would in nn\ w iv be ar | iop in io f r a ce mt to 
consider such circumstances The sole concern 
R( RA! I CORP INC 1 4 5 3 
1440 (HRM 
i t (,U 9(. S ( t i t 2781 Aztec Steel 091 
F 2d i t 482 
[111 On ipp* d however we c innot re 
ibsheillv, hold ig u r r t tins s t indi rd the 
determmition of the court below unle s 
there is offered on the record both a justifi 
cition for the sinction ind in iccounting 
bv the court ind bv, the pirty idverse to 
the nonfei m t l iw \e r of the re ismnble 
ecp'nse mrludmg ittornev s fe( s ciused 
hv the fiilun Accordmglv in e ises 
invoking the sinction powe r of Rule M the 
distnet court must cl< irlv st ite its re i 
sons so th it me imngful revi< w mi> be h id 
on ippe il \lihon ' \ot!*unqrn of 
/t?/>CMee7 Inc %1 rid 191 r>0r> (4th ( ir 
1977) eeit dtnud 411 U S 1020 98 S ( t 
711 r)1 I I eMd 7(8 (1978) When pressed 
for surh evidence ind p^< nfie findings on 
the rerord below counsel for the ippellees 
ron( e fie el i t o rd i rgument t int there wi 
none In the instant cise the coutt of 
fered four gene i il ju-tifie itions for its or 
d r 1) the m t u r e of the misconduct 2) trV 
f vet th it An i n n s con loot w i s burdensome 
on the court ^) the deterrence fie tor un 
de r l \mg Rule T7 ind 4) the fee th it An i 
m i earned through th* impioper conduct 
T in t sud the court ordered An inn to piv 
$10 000 to the registr} of the district court 
without recourse to his client Rut the 
court below filled to set forth in iceount 
ing ichepiite to justify the figure it 
adopteel 
We note from the record that the rniscon 
duct of An m n ivtn alia forced the \p 
pomtmont of i special mi tor obviously 
ftitiihng fees mel costs ciu ced ehscoverv 
disputes resulting m s ^ f n l fruitless pi me 
trips b\ ( irlucci s ittorney ind st iff ind 
neee ssitate el numerous heiring1* and orders 
from four federal district court judges 
While An inn argues t in t the fine imj osed 
w is ' grossly excessive taken together 
is with the far htati i< of di rovcrv and the 
df tenence of abuse of that pi occss We a h ) 
nr te that p rhaps if Mr \t if n In I cr. risidcre 1 
both l i s furilv and f»r an«~nl oblip tions a I 
his obhpati >ns as an o l f t c r of the c > irt be 
mipht ni t 1 in the situation m which he pics 
ently finds himself 
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Anama's handiwork may well hive imount 
ed to $10,000 The court on remand upon 
a full accounting may, in its discretion, 
determine that a sanction gt eater thin 
$10,000 is warranted It may also find that 
the fine is hotter deemed costs to be pud in 
full or p i r t to Cirlucci and/or her it torney 
to compensite them for their expenses 
W P simply are in no position to resolve th i t 
question on ippp ll Rather, we must re-
verse and remand on this issue so that the 
district court miy create a record account 
ing for costs adequate to sustain whatever 
sanction that court ultimately decides is 
justified in light of the repeated refusal of 
Anama to abide by that court's d^povery 
directives 
AFFIUMTI) in p i r t and RFVLRSLD in 
part and REMANDED 
FAY, Circuit Judge, concurring 
Though cagreemg completely with Judge 
Johnson's opinion for the court, I feel com-
pelled to add these few words 
Some years ago a verv wise and expen 
enced trial judge said "Professional courte 
sy is the lubricant that allows the wheels of 
justice to turn smoothly " ' The courts of 
this nation cannot function without the full 
support of all members of the bar Attor 
ne>s are officers of the court It is their 
primary responsibiht) to see that our sys-
tem of jurisprudence works 
Unfortunately—m-^-ny^opmiOfl—the—last^ 
twenty five )ears have seen a great rise in 
the number of individuals admitted to the 
practice of law and a great decline in pro 
fessional standards Sheer numbprs makes 
it impossible for judges to "teach" voung 
law>ers how to pr ictice 1 iw Such mstruc 
tion must come from a combination of all 
segments of the legal profession 
Appellant is a member of one of our 
nation's most respected law firms Clear 
ly, he should have known his conduct was 
totally abhorrent to the standards of our 
profession No client—large or small rich 
or poor, with or without influence—can be 
allowed to corrupt our system of junspru 
dence to protect his, her or its self inter-
ests 
It is my persona) observation that too 
man) practitioners have "sold out to the 
client " While the actual numbers of those 
who have done so may not be great, the 
trend can be disastrous' Advocacy must 
be earned out within the rules The Eng 
hsh differentiate between "solicitors" and 
"ban i s t e r s " Barristers receive special 
training and present the cases in court 
Their traditional values, quality of scholar 
ship and loyalty to the courts is known 
world widp In this country we have devel 
oped many certification procedures for spe-
cialists in certain areas of the law The 
federal courts are implementing new proce 
dures for the admittance of practitioners in 
an effort to improve the quality of advoca 
cy What we must never forget is that we 
all serve as "officers of the court " Failing 
in this endeavor, we will lose much more 
than merely the case a t hand 
[ o SKLTNUMBIRSYSIIM 
UNITED STATES of America, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Al PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 84-5895. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Eleventh Circuit 
Nov 12, 1985 
Government appealed from order oi 
the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida, James C 
Paine J dismissing indictment with preju 
dice under Speedy Trial Act The Court of 
Appeals, Vance, Circuit Judge, held that 
1 Circuit Judge G n d y C n u f o r d Circuit Court idn Dade County Florida 
in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Flor 
UNITED SIA1ES v PHILLIPS 
Cite as 775 F J d 14*4 (I9RS) 
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district judge abused its discretion in dis 
missing with prejudice 
Reversed and remanded with instruc 
tions 
1 Criminal Law Or>77 15(1) 
Delay of less than 80 da \ s from filing 
of defendants speedy trial motion was in 
sufficient to implicate constitutional con 
cerns U S C A Const Amend 6 
2 Criminal Law <S=>577 16(11) 
District court abused its discretion in 
dismissing case with prejudice under 
Speedy Trial Act [18 U S C A § 3162(a)(2)] 
because more than 70 nonexcludable days 
had passed, where charges were serious 
delay was slight and no findings were 
made concerning adverse impact on admin 
istration of Act and justice in general 
Stanley 
David O 
Asst U S 
appellant 
Jeffrey 
Marcus, U S Attv Jon M \y, 
Leiwant Linda Collins Hert7 
Attys , Miami, Fla , for plaintiff 
A Miller, Bruce Rogow Fort 
Lauderdale, F la , for defendant appellee 
Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida 
Before VANCE and HATCHEIT Circuit 
Judges, and ATKINS *, District Judge 
This is the second appeal by the govern 
ment in this casp following the district 
court's dismissal with prejudice of a multi 
count indictment against anpellee, Al Phil 
hps On the prior appeal we concluded 
that the district court had improperly ap 
plied a presumption that dismissals under 
the Speedy Trial Act should be with prpju 
dice We directed that on remand it consid 
er the factors enumerated in 18 U S C 
§ 3162(a)(2) without the influence of the 
improper presumption On remand the dis 
trict court again considered the matter and 
again ruled that the dismissal should be 
with prejudice We now conclude that 
•Honorab le C Cl>dc Atkins U S District Judge 
for the Southern District of I londa silting by 
designation 
such ruling constituted an abuse of discre-
tion We therefore reverse the judgment 
of dismissal with prejudice and remand 
with directions that a judgment of dismis 
sal without prejudice be entered 
I Iacts and Procedural History 
An indictment charging Phillips and oth 
ers with several offenses involving man 
juana importation was filed but sealed on 
March 17, 1983 The indictment was un 
sealed on March 23 1983 and on that date 
Phillips was arrested He entered a plea of 
not guilty On April 18 1983 and again on 
Ma) 17, 1983 the U S Attorney filed 
Speedy Trial reports in which he stated 
t i n t t ru l must b* gin on June H 198} 
' lhe case was set for trial on May 31, 1981, 
but the trial was not held on that date 
The reason does not appear in the record 
At a hearing on Ma\ 2r> 1983 the district 
judge advised counsel that the cise was 
third on the June 6 calendar but stated, 
"Looks like this won t bo tried it this 
point " On June 22 1983 Phillips filed his 
motion to dismiss under the Spend) Trial 
Act because more than sevent) nonexclud 
able days had pissed The government's 
June 23 response did not oppose dismissal 
but argued that the dismissal should be 
without prejudice 
[1] In its order on remand the district 
court recogni7pd the correct analytical 
framework mandated in United States v 
Ruvo, 741 F2d 1264 (11th Cir 1984) It 
also stated t in t it must give consider ltion 
to the factors enumerated m Barker v 
Uuigo 407 U S 511 92 S Ct 2182 33 
L Fd 2d 101 (1972) Its findings on remand 
chronicle the events leading to dismissal, 
but our understanding of the court s apph 
cation of the Russo analysis is not aidnd by 
an) relevant findings or explanations ex 
eppt for statements of conclusion Its ref 
erpnee to Barker is more problematic since 
less than eighty1 da)s of nonexcludable 
1 According to defendant s calculations ninety 



























IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STANLEY C. MANN, ET AL., 
DEFENDANTS. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
JURY )R|AL PROCEEDINGS 
(PARTIAL JURY VOIR DIRE) 
CASE ito. C81-8644 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAlj ON THE 25TH DAY OF 
JULY. 1984. COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 10:10 A.M., THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING 11\ COURTROOM 409 OF THE 
CITY & COUNTY BUILDING, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; SAID CAUSE 
BEING HEARD BY THE HONORABLE PHILIP R. FISHLER, JUDGE IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAhl. 
APPEARANCES 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN. ATTORNEY AT LAW, CHRISTENSEN, 
JENSEN & POWELL, 900 KEARNS BUILDING, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84101, TELEPHONE 355-3431, APPEARING 0N BEHALF OF THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
ROBERT P. SHERLOCK. ATTORNEY 
SOUTH, SUITE 150, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAhi 
AT LAW, 261 EAST 300 
84111, TELEPHONE 
355-1300, APPEARING ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT MANN. 
JULIE N. CLEGG 
CS.R, RPR, CM 




























( W H E R E U P O N , THE F O L L O W I N G P R O -
C E E D I N G ^ CONTINUED IN OPEN 
C O U R T : ) 
T H E C O U R T ! L A D I E S AND GENTLJEMEN, THE BOOK ONE 
AGAINST THE STORM. WHICH I'M HOLDING V>P AGAIN, IN PART DEALS 
WITH THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND IT'S NCW THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
AS A WHOLE. I THINK IT DEALS WITH THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN 
UTAH. IS THERE ANYONE HERE WHO HAS At^ Y OPINION EITHER FOR 
OR AGAINST THE LAWYERS WHO PRACTICE L/U IN THE STATE OF UTAH? 
IN OTHER WORDS, DO YOU FEEL THEY'RE E THER MORE TRUTHFUL THAN 
THE POPULACE AS A WHOLE?IF YOU FEEL THAT WAY, RAISE YOUR 
HAND. 
(PAUSE \ii PROCEEDINGS.) 
THE COURT: LET THE RECORD SHOW NO HANDS ARE RAISED 
(WHEREUPON. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
WERE HAD BUT NOT HEREIN TRAN-
SCRIBED PURSUANT TO REQUESTED 
TRANSCR PT CONTENT.) 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
I, JULIE N. CLEGG, CSR, RPR, CM, OFFICIAL COURT 
REPORTER IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO 
HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
BY ME STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE TIMES AND PLACES 
HEREIN SE FORTH; THAT THE SAME WAS SU&SEQUENTLY BY ME CAUSED 
TO BE REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 AND 
2: AND THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPf 
TION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE ADnllCED, AND PROCEEDINGS 
HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND THIS 




LIE N. CLEGG, Cj 
D PROFESSIONAL RtPCRTER 
TAH CSR NO. 227) 
489 
Tab 12 
1 A YES, IT IS. 
2 0 GENERALLY, WHAT HAS BEEN THE NATURE OF YOUR PRAC-
3 T ICE? 
4 A MY PRACTICE HAS BEEN EXCLUSIVELY IN THE FIELD 
5 OF LITIGATION, AND PRIMARILY REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS IN 
6 CASUALTY ACTIONS, 
7 0 TO WHAT PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, IF ANY, DO YOU 
8 BELONG? 
9 A THE FEDERATION OF INSURANCE COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL 
10 BOARD OF TRIAL ADVOCACY, THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCI-
11 AT ION. 
12 0 TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE YOU $EEN INVOLVED IN ACTIVI-
13 TIES OF THE UTAH STATE BAR? 
14 A WELL, IN MY EARLY PRACTICE, BECAUSE I WAS 
15 PRINCIPALLY A LITIGATOR, I SERVED AS A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
16 FOR THE BAR ON DISCIPLINARY CASES. 
17 MR. SHERLOCK: YOUR HONOF^ , THIS IS IRRE>EVANT, 
18 I BEL IEVE. 
19 THE COURT: APPROACH THE BENCH. 
20 (WHEREUPON, A BENCH CONFERENCE 
WAS HAD WITHIN THE PRESENCE 
21 BUT OUT OF THE HEARING OF 
THE JljiRY. ) 
22 
THE COURT'. OBJECTION SUSTAINED. PROCEED. 
23 
0 (BY MR. CHRISTENSEN) MR+ WADSWORTH, OTHER THAN 
24 




























OF THIS SERIES OF LITIGATION THAT MR. SHERLOCK TALKED ABOUT 
IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT, HAVE YOU HAD ANY DISCIPLINARY 
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST YOU IN THE UTAH STATE BAR? 
A NONE, OR ANYWHERE ELSE. 
0 MR. WADSWORTH, HAVE YOU MAD OCCASION TO BECOME 
ACQUAINTED WITH OR HAVE CONTACT WlJH STANLEY MANN, ONE 
OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE? 
A ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LITIGATION THAT'S 
BEEN MENTIONED. 
0 AND WHEN DID YOU FIRST HAVE OCCASION TO HAVE 
ANY CONTACT WITH HIM IN THAT REGARD? 
I 
A THERE WAS A COURT APPEARANCE ON JANUARY -- I 
THAT WAS REFERRED 
TTER. IT WAS NOT A HEAR" 
BELIEVE IT WAS THE 11TH -- OF 1979 
TO AS A HEARING ON THIS CUSTODY MA 
ING ON THE CUSTODY MATTER, BUT WAS) A HEARING ON WHETHER 
THE UPCOMING HEARING ON THE CUSTODY MATTER SHOULD BE CON-
TINUED, AND I BELIEVE THAT MR. MANJN WAS PRESENT IN THE 
I 
COURTROOM AT THE TIME OF THAT LEGA|L ARGUMENT, ALTHOUGH 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TAKEN. SO THERE WAS NO INTERCOURSE 
OF EXAMINATION, OR ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE, BUT I BELIEVE 
HE WAS THERE. 
0 THAT, TO YOUR RECOLLECTION, IS THE FIRST TIME 
THAT YOU EVER HAD OCCASION TO HAVEJ ANY KIND OF CONTACT 
WITH HIM OR BE AWARE OF HIM, OR ANYTHING OF THAT SORT? 
A YES, SIR. 
71 
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KAfMkCCN * riAAMcrr 
l . l ' N U *fc A S S O C I A T K . 1 
A T T O B N C t J ^ C O U N S G L O W S AT wAw| 
SAI.I I..\MI. u n i r u i HIMII 
I l k i l ' M %l« 
February 6,1981 
Executive Director of the Bar 
Utah State Bar Association 
42S East 100-South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dear Sir: 
In October, 1980," we were approached by Mr. and Mrs. Stanley C. Mann 
who wished us to represent Mrs. Mann as plaintiff in a malicious prosecution 
action against three Salt Lake attorneys. Our initial skepticism was gradually 
dispelled as we thoroughly investigated the Manns' allegations, before accept-
ing the case. Ultimately, after extensive inquiries, Conferences and research, 
we agreed to represent Mrs. Mann and filed the enclosed complaint As our 
investigation progressed, we became aware that the conduct of lawyers was 
involved 
under DR 
Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. This letter is in 
discharge of that obligation and responsibility. 
luon progressed, we oecame aware inai me conduct oi lawyers was 
in such a manner that we would be obligated to report our knowledge 
R I-103^of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule JY* of the 
We realize that the line between zealous representation' of a client and 
malicious prosecution may be a fine one. We also realize, too, that we have 
heard and investigated the facts only as they appear to our client, Mrs. Mann. 
For this reason, in
 v^ovember\|,we approached the lawyers involved and 
informed them of our investigation. We expressed a willingness to meet with 
them to discuss the matter.if they so desired or to Answer any questions. We 
hoped to hear new facts, ^explanations, denials or e^en offers to settle. We 
received no response. In December^ we contacted t^ iem again to inform them 
that the complaint had been prepared and we made copies available to them 
before service. Again there was no response. 
We feel that we have no choice but to report to you that*according to 
the information that we received from our client,! Louise S. Mann, and her 
husband, Stanley C. Mann, and information revealed by public record and our 
own investigation, attorneys H. Wayne Wadsworth, David S. Young, and 
Stephen A. Trost appear to have engaged in conduct contrary to the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, particularly DR 1-102, Dif 2-109, DR 7-102 and with 
regard to David S. Young, DR 4-101. As this conducti is, for the most part, the 
same conduct which forms the basis for our cii^ nC? cause of action, we 
enclose a copy of the complaint for your use and refer you to the ongoing 
pleadings on file with the court. We are ready to be of any assistance in the 
resolution of this matter. 
Sincerely, 
LUND A ASSOCIATES 
Lynn J. Lund 
Attorney at Law 
Kathleen |B. Barrett 





























OR OTHER ATTORNEYS. 
THE COURT! WELL, HE CAN ANSWER THAT "YES" OR 
NO 
'YES' 
MR. SHERLOCK: THAT S RIGHT, AND HE ANSWERED 
0 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, ASK YOUR NEXT QUESTION. 
MR. SHERLOCK: I'M TRYING TO FIND THE DOCUMENT. 
(BY MR. SHERLOCK) LET Mt SHOW YOU WHAT IS MARKED 
AS "EXHIBIT 14-D" AND ASK YOU IF THAT IS A COPY OF THE 
DOCUMENT WHICH YOU HAD IN YOUR POS$ESSION TO WHICH YOU 
REFER. 
YES. 




MR. CHRISTENSEN: I HAVEN'T SEEN 14-D. 
THE COURT: ARE YOU OFFERING 14-D? 
MR. SHERLOCK: I WILL OFI^ER IT ON THE ISSUE OF 
MALICIOUS INTENT, THE COURT HAS RULED ON THAT. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: MAY WE APPROACH THE BENCH? 
THE COURT: YES 
(WHEREIJJPON, A BENCH CONFERENCE 
WAS HA(f) WITHIN THE PRESENCE 
BUT OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE 
JURY.) 
THE COURT: YOU'RE WITHDRAWING 14? 



























YOU CAN GET YOURSELF INTO A LOT Oij LEGAL PROBLEMS. AND 
SO HIS TRUST MONEY WAS NEVER -- OR THE TRUST MONEY OF DAVID 
WAS NEVER DISCUSSED IN CONNECT I ON WITH THE CUSTODY ACTION. 
AND, IN FACT, MARK WHEELER WENT TO ANOTHER ATTORNEY THAT 
WROTE TO INSURANCE COMPANIES, AND THOSE -- WELL, THE 
INSURANCE COMPANIES THAT HAD POLICIES WHEREIN DAVID WAS 
THE BENEFICIARY. I HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THAT. 
0 DID YOU ANTICIPATE ANY PERSONAL GAIN IF MARK 
WAS SUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING CUSTODP 
A ABSOLUTELY NOT. AFTER Tl 
Y OF THE CHILD? 
HE CUSTODY MATTER WAS 
HANDLED, IF I HAD WANTED ANY OF THAT MONEY, I COULD HAVE 
MADE A PETITION TO THE COURT FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF FEES, 
AND I SUPPOSE MOST ANY COURT WOULD HAVE FOUND THAT GIVING 
A CHILD BACK TO ITS NATURAL FATHER OR TO ITS FATHER --
ADOPTIVE FATHER, IN THIS CASE -- WAS A JUSTIFIED EXPEND I-
|N FOR SUCH FEES. I EX-
WHEN HE COULDN'T PAY 
TURE. I NEVER MADE ANY APPLICATIOlf 
PECTED MARK WHEELER TO PAY MY FEES. 
MY FEES AND THAT BECAME OBVIOUS, THEN I WITHDREW FROM THE 
CASE. 
0 I WISHED ALSO TO CALL YOLlR ATTENTION TO THE LAST 
PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 184, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN EXCERPTED BUT 
WHICH, STARTING WITH THE FOURTH L 1 KlE DOWN, SAYS (QUOTE) 
OBVIOUSLY THIS WAS A BIT OF LEGAL DEALERY. WADSWORTH PLOTTED) 
TO BLAME ME IN ORDER TO DEFAME MY CHARACTER. HE THOUGHT 






H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Mark W. Wheeler, 
Father 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 801/363-3300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of: 
DAVID MARK NEWTON WHEELER, 
A Minor. 
MEMORANDUM OF DISBURSEMENTS 
AND COSTS 
Probate No. P 79-2 
J o 
CO * < • 
u 
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 c U 
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Pursuant to Rule 54, btah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
petitioner Mark W. Wheeler submits the following memorandum of 
his necessary costs and disbursements in this action. 
1. Air travel of petitionerIwheeler from 
Burbank, California, to Jj>alt Lake 
City, Utah for: 
(a) January 12, 1979 hearing (not 
claimed, necessary ^o pick up 
minor child) 
(b) June 20, 1979 deposition $ 
(c) July 23, 1979 trial 
Witness fees, January 12,1 
(a) Donald Waldman, Northridge, 
California, 1 day, l|75 miles from 
Utah border . . . 
1979 hearing: 
(b) Dent Hale, Northridge, 
California, 1 day, l|75 miles from 
Utah border . . . 
(c) Sylvi Wheeler, Northridge, 
California, 1 day, 1)75 miles from 
Utah border . . . 
(d) Roger Hacking, Vernaf, Utah, 
1 day, 176 miles . 
(e) Marlyn Mix, Jerome, Idaho, 











3. Witness f ee s , July 23, 1J979 t r i a l : 
(a) Sylv i Wheeler, Nort^hridge 
Cal i fornia, 1 day, 
Utah border . . . 
175 tniles from 
(b) Depositions of Dr 
William Richard Treju 
and Norma N. Waldman 
(c) Attorney's fees inclurr 
case, 80.75 hours alt 
TOTAL COSTS 
Robert H. Marshall, 
, Keith R. Haight 
66. 5( 
$ 281.6( 
ed in custody 
$75.00/hour $6,056.2! 
AND DISBURSEMENTS $7,079.21 
J
 * O 
a < i x 
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R. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Mark W. Wheeler, 
Father 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
8S. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH, after having been first duly sworn, 
deposes and says that he is the attorney for petitioner, Mark W. 
Wheeler, that he is better ihformed than is the petitioner 
Wheeler regarding the costs and disbursements incurred in 
connection with the above referenced matter and that the costs 
and disbursements listed above were reasonably and necessarily 
incurred in said action. ^ 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 31st day of 
August, 1979. 
NQTAF f ARY PUBLIC ^ 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 




























0 - - I N THAT CASE A L S O , THEN, IS " Y E S " , YOU D I D 
i 
FILE PLEADINGS ASKING FOR NO VISITATION RIGHTS; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A WELL, THE OTHER SIDE FILJED PLEADINGS ASKING FOR 
J 
IT. WE RESISTED IT, IS A MORE ACCURATE WAY TO PHRASE IT. 
MR. SHERLOCK: AT THIS TIME, I'LLOFFER BECAUSE 
I WISH TO REFER TO THEM BY EXHIBIT! NUMBERS, 12-D AND 13-
I 
0. THEY ARE PART OF THE FILE IN PROBATE P 79-2, YOUR HONOR. 
i 
I THINK IT WOULD BE QUICKER TO DO [THAT THAN KEEP REFERRING 
BACK TO THE FILE. 
THE COURT! WHAT NUMBERSJARE THEY? 
I 
MR. SHERLOCK: THEY ARE +-. 
I 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: 12-D A^D 13-D. 
MR. SHERLOCK: TWELVE AND 13. 
i 
MR. CHRISTENSEN.' TWELVE IS THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND P 79-2 AND 13 IS A MEMORANDUM J OF COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS IN THE ^AME MATTER. WE OBJECT 
TO BOTH OF THEM AS WHOLLY IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL IN 
ANY ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
THE COURT: ARE THEY SIGNjED BY A JUDGE OF THIS 
COURT? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: THE COSJTS AREN'T. 
j 
MR. SHERLOCK: THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE 
SIGNED BY JUDGE BALDWIN. THE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND DIS-



























MR. CHRISTENSEN." THAT'S CORRECT. 
THE COURT! WOULD YOU BQTH APPROACH THE BENCH. 
YOU BETTER TELL ME WHAT YOU MAKE FOR RELEVANCE ON THAT. 
(wHERduPON, A BENCH CONFERENCE 
WAS HA|D WITHIN THE PRESENCE 
BUT OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE 
JURY,1 
I'LL SUSTAIN THE OBJECTION TO 13, (OVERRULE THE OBJECTION TO 
12. TWELVE IS RECEIVED. PROCEED,! MR. SHERLOCK. 
0 (BY MR. SHERLOCK) MR. W,ADSWORTH, UPON THE SHOOTING1 
1 
OF YOUR CLIENT, MARK WHEELER, YOU (DID, DID YOU NOT, UNDER-
1 
TAKE TO MAKE COMMENTS CONCERNING M{R . MANN'S POSSIBLE INVOLVE-
MENT IN THAT SHOOTING TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN BOTH 
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND/OR THE! STATE OF UTAH? 
A WHAT PERIOD IN TIME? 
0 AFTER THE SHOOTING, SHORTLY AFTER THE SHOOTING, 
BETWEEN THE SHOOTING AND, LET'S SA[T, THAT FALL. 
I 
A WELL, A LOT OF THINGS WENT ON BETWEEN THE SHOOT-
ING AND THAT FALL. THERE WERE SOM^ CONTACTS INITIALLY 
OF A PROCEDURAL NATURE IN WHICH HE 
LATER ON, AFTER HE WAS IDENTIFIED 
THEN THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION REGKRDING HIM, SO YOU'RE 
GOING TO HAVE TO BE MORE SPECIFIC. 
MR. SHERLOCK: I HATE TO|GET INTO IT, YOUR HONOR, 
BUT THE WITNESS HAS OPENED IT UP. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: WELL, »fLL MOVE TO STRIKE THAT 
WAS NOT MENTIONED. 
IN THE HYPNOTIC INTERVIEW, 
163 
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H. WAYNE WADSWORTH C U** 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 801/363-3300 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT ()F UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 




STANLEY C. MANN and LOUISE S. 
MANN, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS1 ANSWERS TO 
INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. C 79-077^W 
Come Now the plaintiffs herein and answer defendants' 
interrogatories dated January 18, 1980 as follows: 
Interrogatory No. 1: With respect to the allegation con-
tained in paragraph 19 of the complaint herein that "defendants 
thereupon conspired with persons unknown to kill Mark Whpeler", 
state the factual basis of said allegation, including: 
a. A particularized statement of each and every fact, 
whether or not admissible as evidence, upon which said 
allegation is based; 
ANSWER: 
(1) Defendants had financial motivation to kill the 
plaintiff, Mark Wheeler; 
(2) The plaintiff, Mark Wheeler, had no enemies or 
disputes with any other persons other than tt^ e 
defendant, Stanley Mann; and 
(3) The defendant, Stanley Mann, was seen at the scene 
of the shooting by the plaintiff, Sylvi Wheeler. 
>. The identity of each person who has any knowledge, 
whether or not such knowledge constitutes admissible 




ANSWER The plaintiffs herein. 
c. The identity of each and every conversation or 
communication which tends to support said allegation; 
ANSWER- Plaintiffs have no knowledge of conversations 
relating to the conspiracy, but with respect to the motivation 
and state of mind of the defendant, Stanley Mann, the following 
conversations are relevant: 
(1) Shortly after the death of Joan Wheeler, Stanley 
Mann told Mark Wheeler that he would never see his son, 
David Wheeler, again; and 
(2) A few days after the shooting incident, Stanley 
Mann told Officers Ritter and Pierce of the Los Ajngeles 
Police Department of his commitment to Joan Wheeler to do 
j anything possible to prevent Mark Wheeler from obtaining 
0 
x custody of David Wheeler or of managing any trust funds 
D
. of David Wheeler in the event of her death. 
> 
d. The identity of each and every document whicl> contains 
< any facts, whether or not admissible as evidence, which 
$ tends to support said allegation, 
n 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs know of no documents relating to the 
conspiracy, but as to the financial motivation of the defendants 
and the desires of Joan Wheeler relating to defendants' commitment 
above mentioned, the following documents are relevant: 
(1) The Will of Joan Newton Wheeler dated November 27, 
1977; and 
(2) A letter of Joan Wheeler to the defendants dated 
January 23, 1978. 
Interrogatory No. 2: With respect to the allegation con-
tained in paragraph 20 of the complaint herein that "in furtherance 
of said conspiracy, on Friday, May 11, 1979 at approximately 
10:30 p.m., an unknown gunman accousted the plaintiff Mark Wheeler 
. . . and shot him at close range with a small caliber handgun", 
state the factual basis thereof, including: 
a. A particularized statement of each and every fact, 
-2-
u 
whether or not admissible as evidence, upon which said 
allegation is based; 
b. The identity of each person who has any knowledge, 
whether or not such knowledge constitutes admissible 
evidence, of any facts which tend to support said allega-
tion; 
c. The identity of each and every conversation oi 
communication which tends to support said allegation; 
d. The identity of each and every document which con-
tains any facts, whether or not admissible as evidence 
which tends to support said allegation. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs assume the gist of this interrogatory 
relates to the conspiracy involvement of defendants rather than 
^ the fact that the plaintiff, Mark Wheeler, was shot as alleged, 
c 
i and with respect to the involvement of defendants, plaintiffs 
3
. have knowledge of no facts other than those referred to .^n answer 
to the preceding interrogatory. 
u 
< Interrogatory No. 3: With respect to the allegation con-
tained in paragraph 19 of the complaint that defendants |'realiz[ed] 
the appointment of themselves as guardians of David by the Will 
of Joan Wheeler could be effective only if the father, Mark 
Wheeler, plaintiff herein, was dead or adjudged incapacitated", 
state the factual basis thereof, including: 
a. A particularized statement of each and every fact, 
whether or not admissible as evidence, upon which said 
allegation is based; 
ANSWER: 
(1) Defendants were present in the Courtroom^ of 
Judge Croft on January 12, 1979, when Judge Croft explained 
that fact to defendants' counsel in discussing the provi-
sions of Section 75-5-202, U.C.A., 1953, as amended; and 
-3-
(2) The aforementioned statutory provision was also 
referred to on page 3 of Judge Croft's Memorandum Decision 
dated January 17, 1979. 
b. The identity of each person who has any knowledge, 
whether or not such knowledge constitutes admissible 
evidence, of any facts which tend to support said allega-
tion; 
ANSWER: Judge Croft, the Court personnel present, the 
parties to this litigation and their respective counsel &t the 
January 12, 1979, hearing. 
c. The identity of each and every conversation ot 
communication which tends to support said allegation; 
ANSWER: In addition to the conversations involved in the 
January 12, 1979 hearing, defendant Stanley Mann acknowledged to 
Officers Ritter and Pierce during his interrogation at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, that he realized he could not financially profit 
from the David Wheeler trust unless he were able to adopt said 
minor. It is assumed that Stanley Mann realized that he could 
not adopt the child unless he were first permitted to have 
guardianship of the child, which would be precluded if tne Court 
awarded the plaintiff Mark Wheeler permanent guardianship of 
ihis son. 
d. The identity of each and every document which con-
tains any facts, whether or not admissible as evidence which tends 
to support said allegation. 
ANSWER: Judge Croft's Memorandum Decision dated January 17 
1979. 
Interrogatory No. 4: With respect to the allegation con-
tained in paragraph 19 herein, that defendants "realiz[ed] there 
was little chance of having the plaintiff herein adjudged in-
capacitated", state the factual basis thereof including: 
a. A particularized statement of each and every fact, 
whether or not admissible as evidence, upon which said 
allegation is based; 
-4-
ANSWER: 
(1) It was obvious at the January 12, 1979, hearing 
before Judge Croft that the plaintiff Mark Wheeler was 
in good physical and mental health; and 
(2) From the dialogue engaged in between the Court 
and counsel at the January 12, 1979, hearing and Judge 
Croft's Memorandum Decision relating thereto, it was 
evident that the Court did not deem that the plaintiff 
Mark Wheeler had forfeited any rights to his minor son and 
under the legal standards discussed regarding unfitness, 
it would have been apparent to defendants that they had 
no evidence of the fact that plaintiff Mark Wheel[er was 
an unfit parent. 
b. The identity of each person who has any knowledge, 
whether or not such knowledge constitutes admissible 
evidence, of any facts which tend to support saia allega-
tion; 
ANSWER: See answer to 3b above. 
c. The identity of each and every conversation dr 
communication which tends to support said allegation; 
ANSWER: In addition to the conversations which were part 
of the January 12, 1979 hearing above mentioned, the defendant 
Stanley Mann approached the plaintiff Mark Wheeler after a court 
appearance in Los Angeles, California, and offered money to the 
plaintiff Wheeler as an inducement for him to relinquish his 
fight for custody of his minor son, which would tend to show that 
Stanley Mann did not have serious expectation of showing Mark 
Wheeler to be incapacitated or unfit to have custody of his son 
when trial of those issues was to take place. 
d. The identity of each and every document whicti con-
tains any facts, whether or not admissible as evidence 
which tends to support said allegation. 
-5-
ANSWER: Judge Croft's Memorandum Decision of January 17, 
1979. 
Interrogatory No. 5: With respect to the allegations 
contained in paragraph 20 of the complaint that an unknown 
gunman accousted and shot plaintiff Mark Wheeler "in fur therance 1 
of said conspiracy" state the factual basis thereof, including: 
a. A particularized statement of each and every fact, 
whether or not admissible as evidence, upon whicji said 
allegation is based; 
b. The identity of each person who has any knowledge, 
whether or not such knowledge constitutes admissible 
evidence, of any facts which tend to support saip allega-
tion; 
5 
i c. The identity of each and every conversation 6r 
0 
* communication which tends to support said allegation; 
. d. The identity of each and every document whic^ i con-
u
 tains any facts, whether or not admissible as evidence 
u 
* 
< which tends to support said allegation. < ANSWER: In answer to this interrogatory, plaintiffs are 
unaware of any facts, witnesses, conversations or documents other 
than those referred to in answer to the preceding interrogatories. 
Interrogatory No. 6: Identify all persons whom you con-
tend participated in the conspiracy to kill plaintiff Mfrk W. 
Wheeler as alleged in the complaint herein. 
ANSWER: The identity of the persons other than the 
defendant Stanley Mann are unknown. 
Interrogatory No. 7: Identify all conversations and 
communications which you have had with any police officer or 
law enforcement agency regarding: 
a. The conspiracy to kill plaintiff Mark Wheelef as 
alleged in the complaint herein; 
b. The assault upon the plaintiff Mark Wheeler as 
alleged in the complaint herein. 
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ANSWER: With respect to the assault upon Mark Wheeler, 
the plaintiffs have had several conversations with Officers Ritter 
and Pierce at plaintiffs' residence, at the Northridge Hospital 
and at the Devonshire Police Station. These conversations in-
volved the defendants only to the extent of advising the^  in-
vestigating officers that defendants were the only persons known 
to the plaintiffs who could conceivably benefit from the death 
of Mark Wheeler and that the defendant Stanley Mann was the only 
individual who had recently expressed any animosity or ijard 
feelings toward Mark Wheeler. The only conversations wilth police 
officers which would indicate that the defendant Stanley Mann 
participated in the attempt to kill Mark Wheeler was the^  inter-
view of Lieutenant William Gaida with Sylvi Wheeler conducted 
while Sylvi Wheeler was in a state of hypnosis wherein she iden-
tified the defendant Stanley Mann as one of three individuals who 
were present at the scene of the shooting. She did not recognize 
the actual assailant as anyone she knew, but she identified 
Stanley Mann as standing a short distance away watching the 
assault and then the two of them got into an automobile which 
was driven by a third person which she never saw. 
Interrogatory No. 8: Identify all documents disclosing 
or pertaining to any and all conversations and communications 
identified in response to Interrogatory No. 7 above. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs knew of no documents relating to the 
conversations in question other than notes made by the investi-
gating officers. 
Interrogatory No. 9: With respect to the allegations con-
tained in paragraph 14 of the complaint herein that "thi conduct 
of defendants in refusing to deliver David to his father [from 
December 28, 1978 until January 13. 1979] was willful, *|anton, 
and malicious and was done with a reckless disregard for the 
legal and lawful rights of the plaintiff Mark Wheeler" state the 
factual basis thereof including: 
a. A particularized statement of each and every fact, 
-7-
y 
whether or not admissible as evidence, upon which said 
allegation is based; 
ANSWER: 
(1) Defendants categorically refused to deliver David 
Wheeler to his father after the death of Joan Wheeler; 
(2) Defendants attempted to and did obtain ^n ex 
parte order of temporary guardianship contrary tc^  the 
statutes of the State of Utah; 
(3) In obtaining the order of temporary guardianship, 
defendants represented to the Court that they did not 
know Mark Wheeler's California address when in fict they 
did know it, or could have easily obtained it from their 
California counsel; 
(4) Defendants continued to resist Mark Wheeler's 
efforts to obtain permanent custody of his son e^en after 
the Court had awarded him temporary custody and it was 
obvious that according to the statutes of the State of 
Utah, Mark Wheeler had not abandoned his son and defendants 
* had no information of any facts which would constitute 
Mark Wheeler unfit to have custody of his son; and 
(5) After Judge Croft advised counsel orally of his 
ruling with respect to awarding Mark Wheeler temporary 
custody of his son, defendants attempted to frustrate said 
order by advising Mark Wheeler through counsel qiat David 
had been sent to the State of California, 
b. The identity of each person who has any knowledge, 
whether or not such knowledge constitutes admissible 
evidence, of any facts which tend to support said allega-
tion; 
ANSWER: Mark Wheeler; the defendants and their counsel in 
the custody action; Norma N. Waldman, 19126 Vista Grandp Way, 
Northridge, California; Keith R. Haight, 2710 West Temple, County 
of Los Angeles, California; William Richard Treu, 10619 Melvin 
Avenue, Northridge, California; Robert H. Marshall, M.D., 16260 
Ventura Boulevard, Encino, California; and Officers Ritter and 
Pierce. 
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c. The identity of each and every conversation dr 
communication which tends to support said allegation; 
ANSWER: See the deposition transcripts of the aqove men-
tioned individuals. 
d. The identity of each and every document which con-
tains any facts, whether or not admissible as evidence, 
which tends to support said allegation. 
ANSWER. Plaintiffs know of no documents other than those 
heretofore identified in these answers to interrogatories and 
the documents filed in the custody action. 
Interrogatory No. 10: State whether or not plairitiff Mark 
Wheeler requested that the court award him attorneys fees in 
the action entitled in the matter of: David Mark Newton^ Wheeler, 
o a minor filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
* County, State of Utah, Probate No. P 79-2. If your answer is 
5 anything other than a unqualified negative, state the fallowing: 
£ a. The sum of attorneys fees which you requested; 
* b. The disposition made by the court of such request; 
5 c. The identity of each and every document reflecting 
< 
to or pertaining to said request for attorneys fe|es and 
the disposition made by the court of said request. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs claimed attorneys fees in th4ir cost 
bill filed at the conclusion of the custody case. 
a. $6,056.25. 
b. On defendants' motion to tax petitioner Wheeljer's 
cost bill in the custody case, the Court stated t[hat the 
custody action was not the type of an action in which 
attorneys fees could be awarded and denied petitioner 
Wheeler's request for a substantive hearing on tl|e amount 
of attorneys fees claimed. 
c. Petitioner Wheeler's Memorandum of Disbursements and 
Costs dated August 31, 1979, filed in the custody case, 
Probate No. P 79-2. The Court denied the request as 
explained above. 
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Interrogatory No. 11; State whether or not since December 
28, 1978 you have received any care or treatment from anV medical 
doctor or any other person for mental and/or emotional distress. 
If your answer is anything other than an unqualified negative state 
the following: 
a. The identity of each such medical doctor or person 
from whom you have received such treatment; and 
b. The identity of each and every document reflecting 
or pertaining to such care and treatment. 
ANSWER: Marfc Wheeler received a psychiatric consultation 
while at the Northridge Hospital from a psychiatrist whoie name 
he does not now recall. As a result of that consultation, the 
psychiatrist did not believe further psychiatric treatment was 
2 necessary. However, it was recommended that Sylvi Wheeler re-
! ,ceive psychiatric treatment to help her cope with the situation 
< 
^ of having seen her liusband shot in front of her, but due to the 
> 
5 strained economic circumstances inflicted upon the plaintiffs 
5 as a result of the ^hooting of Mark Wheeler, such psychiatric 
treatment was never received. A reference to the psychiatric 
consultation received by Mark Wheeler is probably contained 
within the Northridge Hospital chart reflecting his admission 
and treatment at said hospital. 
y 
WAYNE WADSWORTH 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Flobr 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs! 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH, after having been first duly sworn, 
deposes and says that he is one of plaintiffs' attorneys^ and as 
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such has been authorized by the plaintiffs who are non-residents 
of the State of Utah to file the foregoing ANSWERS TO INTER-
ROGATORIES on their behalf and that the information contained 
therein is true and correct according to the information he has 
received to date from his clients and other sources as reflected 
in his file of this action. 
\YNE WADSWORTU f WA
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /c/ day [of 
February, 1980. 
C /. i. f X 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: ^  *JL* " * <; ' 
'*/ 
My Commission Expires: 
^ s ^ J 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS1 ANSWERS TO 
INTERROGATORIES to Gordon L. Roberts, Esq. and Raymond J. 
Etcheverry, Esq., PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER, Attorneys fcpr 
Defendants, 79 South State Street, P. 0. Box 11898, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84147, this /^/ day of February, 1980. 
T 
'J . X -N- y 
- i i -
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PAUL H. LIAPIS 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-6996 
PILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE T Salt Lake County Utah 
P^puty CJerfc 
3rd EM«t- Court 
-^ _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT IJ^ KE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of 
DAVID MARK NEWTON WHEELER, 
A Minor. 
OBJECTION TO DECREE 
Probate No. P-79-2 
Comes now the Petitioners Stanley C. Mann and Louise S. 
Mann and hereby object to the Decree filed with the court in 
the above entitled matter. Said objection|made on the grounds 
and for the following reasons. 
That the court in its decision did noit award the Petitioner 
Mark Wayne Wheeler any costs of this court I in this action. In 
addition Petitioners further object that the Petitioner Mark 
Wayne Wheeler has interpreted the term costs of action to award 
the attorney fee in his filing of his Memorandum of Disbursement 
and Costs the same not being intended or awarded by the court 
during the trial or in its minute entry following the filing 
of Memorandums with regard to visitation. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioners Stanley C. Mannl and Louise S. Mann 
hereby move the court to require Petitionees attorney to strike 
Paragraph 3 of the Decree 
5" DATED this day of September, 197|9 
GUSTIHL ADAMSL TING & LIAPIS 
PAUL H 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fore-
going Objection was mailed, postage prepaidi to H. Wayne Wadsworth, 
Esq., at 310 South Main, L^h Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, 
postage prepaid, this ? ^ day of SerfE&mber, 197^ 
i» <j3nitMi.iUt.iira. r— ill—_-W 
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PAUL H. LIAPIS 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorney for Defendant 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 




|!N CLERK'S OFFICE 
Lake County Utah 
W. 8terUng| j E v w i , Clerk 3rd Ditt. Qourt 
Deputy C4crk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
*s 
In the Matter of: 
DAVID MARK NEWTON WHEELER, 
a Minor. 
) 
ORDER TJAXING COSTS 
Probate No. P 79-2 
PETITIONER MANN'S Motion to Tax Costs (having come 
on regularly for hearing before the Honorable t m e s t F. 
Baldwin, Jr., one of the Judges of the above-entitled court 
on the 13th day of September, 1979, Petitioner | WHEELER 
appearing by and through his attorney, H. Wayn^ Wadsworth, 
and Petitioner MANN appearing by and through his attorney, 
Paul H. Liapis, the matter having been argued to the court 
with regard to Petitioner Wheeler's Memorandum of Disburse-
ments and Costs, and the court also having hearjd argument 
with regards to Petitioner Mann's Objection to Decree with 
regards to the awarding of costs therein, and the court 
having reviewed the files and records herein, and having 
taken the matter under advisemen£ and having is^ 
Written Memorandum Decision and upon Motion of 
attorney for Petitioner Mann: 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED: 
1. Petitioner Wheeler's Memorandum of Disbursements 
of Costs requesting reimbursement for air travel of Petitioner 
Wheeler on January 12, 1979, June 20, 1979 and fuly 23, 1979, 
and being the same is hereby denied. 
2. Petitioner Wheeler's request for coits for 
witness fees for the January 12, 1979 hearing fq>r Donald 
sued its 
Paul H. Liapis, 
Waldman, Dent Hale, Roger Hacking, Marilyn Mix being the 
i 
same is hereby taxed against the Petitioner Mann for a total 
sum of $244.40. 
3. Petitioner Wheeler's request! to tax costs for 
the witness fee of Sylvi Wheeler on the hearing January 
12, 19 79 being the same is hereby denied. 
4. Petitioner Wheeler's request to tax costs as 
witness fees for Sylvi Wheeler and attorney fees for his 
attorney being the same is hereby deniedl 
5. Petitioner Wheeler's request to tax costs for 
the Depositions of Dr. Robert Marshall, William Richard 
Treu, Keith R. Haight and Norma N. Waldmin being the same 
is hereby granted, in the sum of $281.60k f * ATTEST 
DATteD this \M_^> day of September^-1979 . Ov / ^  CUT^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify on this / 7 dayl of September a 
true &nd correct copy of the above Order taxing Costs was 
mailed, postage prepaid to H. WayrieOjtedswortJi/ 310 South 
Mam, 12th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 8410; 








plaintiff, all of which are false: 
(a) On I^se 12, the Book states that the plaintiff par-
ticipated in barratry and (champerty in the followinc 
language: 
"I fully believed thafestoark would let the 
matter drop* He would nave, too, if only 
both of his brother s\in-law, Wayne 
Wadsworth and David Youhg, had not 
advised him. They tjjtought t>here was a 
good chance.that if ^ lejgained cqstody of 
the boy, (&0 could still get corH^ol of 





(b) On Page 42, the Book states that the plaintif 
bribed a prospective witnesp, Dr. Robert H. Marshall 
for the apparent purpose of giving false testimony, a 
his deposition in the following language: 
"The hearing brought out a number of 
facts that appalled me. First, it seemed 
'that Sylvi and Wadsworth (her brother-in-
law, remember), had 'bought1 the testi-
mony of an incompetentTWocWIT*whose words 
simply aped Sylvifs and Mark's opinions. 
(c) On Page 43, the Book states that the plaintif 
misdirected the Court in th^ following language: 
EBjut what hurt most w^s Wheeler's 
and Wadsworth's attempts to misdirec 
the Court. And, unfortunately for Davie 





four times a day. I couldn't believe this was the same child 
we held in our arms only six months earlier. That sturdy, 
robust little man! 
Our attorney was unable to assert an^ evidence of rela-
tionship between the boy and ourselves; consequently David 
was awarded to the custody of Mark and his new wife Sylvi, 
whom the doctor commended for having done a remarkable 
job with David. In view of the fact that Mark had been criti-
cally shot after David went to live with the Wheelers, I would 
assume that any degree of "stabilizing \ was remarkable. 
What a situation for a boy only four ye^rs old! 
The hearing brought out a number of facts that appalled 
me. First, it seemed that Sylvi and Wads^|vorth (her brother-
in-law, remember) had "bought7' the testimony of an incom-
petent doctor whose words simply aped Sylvi's and Mark's 
opinions. Second, the Wheelers had obviously prompted the 
boy to respond in a negative way toward Joan, Louise, and 
me. Third, the Wheelers seemed to be the <poctor's only source 
of information. Not only had he made nd> effort to get to the 
bottom of David's problem, he was actually misinformed. 
The doctor testified under oath that Divid saw his father 
shot, but Mark testified under oath at a later date that this 
was not so. In short, the doctor simply! reinforced Mark's 
attitude toward Joan, and, as a matter of record, the doctor's 
testimony was largely made up of quotations from Sylvi. 
The last time I saw Mark at the time cpf the divorce settle-
ment, when he tried to pick up the house check, he appeared 
extreme in dress. Louise didn't even recognize him. His hair 
was long and he had a string of beads around his neck. On 
January 11th he cleaned up. This was the custody hearing and 
apparently he went to a lot of trouble to look conservative. 
Obviously other preparations had been i^iade for the hearing 
as well. 
The Wheelers' main witness was Ddctor Robert H. Mar-
shall, whose testimony cut me to the qui^rk. I couldn't believe 
42 
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WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, Second College Edition^ 
Copyright © 1980 (newly revised) and 1979 by 
WILLIAM COLLINS PUBLISHERS. INC. 
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1682 Punctuation, Mechanics, and Manuscript Form 
3 . Use parentheses to enclose figures and letters in the text 
of a piece of writing to indicate order of enumeration. 
The subjects of the medieval quadrivium were (1) arithmetic, 
(2) geometry. (3) astronomy, and (4) music. 
4# Use parentheses to enclose cross-references. 
The amount of this yearly increase is astonishing (see Appen-
dix A). 
"Unexceptionable" is not to be confused with "unexceptional" 
(consult the dictionary). 
5 . Use parentheses in formal business transactions to con-
firm a sum previously given in words. 
I enclose my check for five hundred dollars ($500.00) to cover 
payment in full. 
6. The conventions governing the use of parentheses wi th 
other marks of punctuation are as follows: 
a . W h e n a complete sentence within parentheses stands 
alone (that is, not as part of another sentence), the 
terminal punctuation is enclosed within parentheses. 
He said that knowledge is sometimes useful. (That must be the 
unexceptionable statement of the century.) 
b . W h e n a complete sentence within parentheses is part 
of another sentence: 
• I t does not begin with a capital letter unless the first 
word is a proper noun. 
• N o period is used within the parentheses. 
• If it is a question, a question mark is used within the 
parentheses. 
Later in his Preface on Bosses in his volume of plays of 1936, he 
was back praising Mussolini again and even throwing a few land 
words to Hitler, whom he described as "not a stupid German" 
(did Bernard Shaw prefer a crazy Austrian?) and whose perse-
cution of the Jews he characterized considerately as "a craze, 
a complex, a bee in his bonnet, a hole in his armor, a hitch in his 
statesmanship, one of those lesions which sometimes prove fatal." 
(Edmund Wilson) 
c W h e n a word, phrase, or clause wi th in parentheses is 
part of a sentence: 
• A comma, semicolon, or period is never used after the 
last word in the parentheses. 
• A comma, semicolon, or period is used following the 
second parenthesis only if the sentence without the 
parenthetical material requires punctuat ion at that 
point. 
• A question mark or exclamation mark is used within 
the parentheses if i t applies t o the material within the 
parentheses. 
But the man finds himself faced with the question he imagines 
the horse to be asking: what is there to stop for out there in the 
cold, away from bin and stall (house and village and mankind?) 
and all that any self-respecting beast could value on such a 
night? (John Ciardi) 
7. In a typed manuscript a parenthesis within a sentence 
is separated from the words on either side of it b y a single 
space. A sentence standing by itself within parentheses is 
separated from the preceding and following sentences b y 
two spaces. 
Quotation Marks [ " " ] 
1. Use quotation marks to enclose all direct quotat ions. 
"Are you." she asked, "the man who helped my son?" 
Yes," he said, "I helped him. I didn't do much, though." 
2. Use single quotation marks to enclose a quotat ion within 
another quotation. 
In Literary Symbolism, Maurice Beebe says, "Mary McCarthy 
admits that a writer does not always know beforehand just what 
he intends to accomplish in a story, which is always for him, 
as well as for the reader, 'a little act of discovery.' " 
*• Use quotation marks to enclose titles of articles, chapters 
of a book, essays, short stories, short poems, and musical 
com positions. 
The third chapter, "Some Solutions to the Problem," is perhaps 
the most valuable in the book. 
yne of Emerson's characteristic essays ia "Self Reliance." 
• enjoyed Steinbeck's short story "The Leader of the People." 
2>ne made us memorize the poem "Dover Beach," which none 
<* us liked. 
She sang "Over the Bounding Waves" loudly and with appro-
pnate gestures. 
*• Use quotation marks to enclose words spoken of as 
ff01^.3, W o r d s used in special seni ;s , or words emphasized. 
^ j 0 3 m a y a^*° b e u s e d in such cases.) 
5°n>e people consider that all such words as "good," "bad," 
t*»utiful," "ugly" only indicate one's own emotional reactions 
•°
w
*rds actions or things and in no sense properties of the 
Jftions or things themselves. (Robert H. Thouless) 
J 0 ^ ** assumed to be always "brute" power, crude, ugly, and 
Jjndiscnminating, the way an elephant appears to be. (Lionel 
^ TnlUng) 
• ^ s e indentation and single spacing with no quotat ion 
J****5 for a quotation of more than three or four lines. 
. G e n e r a l l y speaking, do not use quotat ion marks to re-
t j - ? 1 ^ a n g« If the slang expression is the best and most 
J**** expression for the context, then use it without the 
°gy of quotation marks; if it is not, putt ing it in quo-
tat ion marks probably will not improve it or make it 
acceptable. -^ , 
7. The conventions governing the use of quotation marks 
with other forms of punctuation are as follows: 
a . The comma and the period are always enclosed within 
quotation marks. 
"I'm sorry," he said, '•but I don't believe you," 
b . The colon and semicolon are never enclosed within 
quotation marks. 
I had not read Francis Bacon's essay, "Of Truth"; in fact, 
I had never heard of it. 
c The dash, question mark, and exclamation mark are 
enclosed within quotation marks if they apply to the 
quoted material. They are placed after the quotation 
marks if they apply to the whole sentence. 
"Am I going too?" she asked. 
Did she say, "I am going too"? 
Brackets [ ] 
1. Use brackets t o enclose matter which y o u insert in the 
text of a quoted passage t o explain, comment , or correct. 
"He was born in 1805 (actually in 18021 in . . . . " 
According to Tim* magazine, "It [Rabbit, Run] was a flawlessly 
turned portrait of a social cripple who understood somehow 
that, running, he was more alive than he would be standing still." 
2 . Use brackets to enclose the Lat in word sic, meaning 
"thus ," when you insert it into a quotat ion following a 
mistake in fact, spelling, grammar, e t c t o indicate to the 
reader that y o u are quoting verbatim from your source and 
that the mistake was in your source and was not yours. 
"Andrew Johnson never attended school and was scarcely able 
to read when he met Eliza McCardle, whom he married on 
May 5, 1927 {sic}." 
3 . In a typed manuscript insert brackets in ink if your 
typewriter lacks these characters. 
Apostrophe [' ] 
1. Use the apostrophe to indicate the possessive case of the 
noun or pronoun. 
the student's book 
John's golf clubs 
one's obligation 
2 . a . For nouns not ending in s add the apostrophe fol-




b . For singular nouns ending in an x, JA, or s sound, the 
possessive is formed either b y adding the apostrophe to 
the final s or by adding the apostrophe and another s. 
Tames' book or James's book 
Mr. Jones' house or Mr. Jones's house 
conscience' sake or conscience's sake 
c For plural nouns ending in an s, sh, or s sound, use the 
apostrophe alone. 
the Joneses* house 
dogs' collars 
the ladies' purses 
d . In compound constructions place the apostrophe and 
s on the word standing immediate ly before the word 
being modified. 
the King of England's daughter 
anyone else's opinion 
sister-in-law's cousin 
e . Joint possession is denoted by adding the apostrophe 
and s to the last name only or to all the names. 
Wendy, Tony, and Christopher's home 
Wendy's, Tony's, and Christopher's home 
f. Separate ownership is denoted by the apostrophe and 
s after each name and the plural form of the modified 
word. 
Wendy's, Tony's, and Christopher's homes 
Selma s and Debbie's typewriters 
3 . Use the apostrophe to indicate the omission of letters 
or figures. 
we've, won't, it's, can't, '69 
4 . Use an apostrophe to indicate the plurals of figures, 
letters, and words referred to as such. 
Watch your p's and q's. 
There are too many 5's in the number. 
There are too many "and's" in your sentence. 
It was a party of VJ.P.'s. 
5 . D o not use the apostrophe with the personal and rela-
t ive pronouns to indicate possession. 
Is it yours? (not 1$ it your's?) 
Its color is faded, (not It's color is faded.) 
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been informed by 
Brief, are criminal in nature 
bring them to your attention. 
Officers of the Court. Inc' 
statement, signed under oath 
have been made for a copy of the Brief filed with the 
on February 19, 1988, to be delivered to you. I have 
the Appellate Court that changes, such as those in the 
Therefore, I ffelt it my responsibility to 
All are felonies and were committed by 
luded with the Brief is a copy of the 
by two officer^ of the Court, H. Nayne 
Wadsworth on his own behalf and James P. Cowlet, as an Officer of the Law 
Firm of Natkiss & Campbell, a professional corporation (R. 879-893) which 
clearly affirms the destruction of documents,! a felony, in violation of 
Utah Statute 76-8-510, The Brief affirms perjury, in violation of Utah 
Code 76-8-501, 502, 503, 504, 505 by the abov^ two parties and David S. 
Young, currently a Third District Judge. The Brief affirms Deceit & 
Collusion, in violation of Utah Code 78-51-31 by the above parties and 
R. Ray Christensen, attorney. 
If the question of Statute of Limitations should arise, I can supply 
documentation of the acts. The act of destruction of documents is still 
within the Statute of Limitations and will be for at least another 120 
days. 
As I understand, this matter would fall under your jurisdiction. If 
this is not correct, I would appreciate you letiing me know at once whose 
jurisdiction it would fall under. 
If an Officer of the Court is allowed to destroy evidence to deny 
another individual his right to a fair trial, on the merits, the veracity 
of our entire judicial system is destroyed, t have confidence that you 
will not allow this serious threat to our judicial system go unaddressed. 
The evidence relating to this matter is fojjnd in the Brief beginning 
on Page 4, Statement of Facts, through Page 52. In addition to what is 
- 1 -
contained in the Record, I have other documents which relate to this 
matter and which show that R. Ray Christensdn had in his possession 
documentation detailing the felonious acts of the above individuals prior 
to filing Motions in the Court contrary to those documents, which I would 
be happy to turn over relative to your investigation. 
It is not unreasonable to expect that the training of both Mr. 
Wadsworth and Mr. Young would preclude their ac 
weeks after the shooting. These actions inc" 
visit to a judge, R. 4A, Pg. 82^ through 83. a 
223, a visit to a General Authority of the L. 
224 through 236. contacting law enforcement 
and 
223 
level R. 4A, Pg. 82 through 83. national 
u and inferring involvement of individuals 
without one single piece of evidence. Thes 
associated with a reasonable rational person, 
unless there was an ulterior motive. 
p o n s during the first few 
uded making an ex-parte 
hd R. 5A, Pg. 203 through 
D. S. Church, R 
officers both on 




in such a serious crime 
actions would not be 
let alone an attorney, 
If I can be of any further help, please let fne know. 
Sincerely, 
Stanley£r. Mann 
P. O.Jfox 27317 
Salt take City, jut. 84127-0317 
Tele: (801) 278-^ 9460 
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